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Unrest is a web-based magazine dedicated to advancing critical conflict theory and expanding the general discourse within the field of peace and conflict studies. Its aim is to explore the structures responsible for human discontent and cultures of violence. It seeks to address the failures of both neo-realist and relativist theories to understand the complexity of contemporary conflicts and to work for solutions free from exploitation and coercion. Unrest is founded on the belief that the seeds of discontent and violence are sown by the structures of domination. Unrest covers a range of subjects including: world politics; the global and political economy; contemporary social and political theory; philosophy, history, and art.

The magazine is an outlet for people interested in approaching these challenges through a critical lens, one that acknowledges the human and environmental costs of conflict. We do not publish rants or have political party affiliations. Unrest is an experimental approach that bridges the gap between zines and academic scholarly journals by creating a multifaceted space for both. Though Unrest advocates critical approaches to analysis and practice, its main aim is to publish intelligent and well-written work that pushes the edge of current discourses. Contributors come from a range of philosophical and ideological backgrounds. Visitors to the magazine have free access to all content. Unrest is edited and managed by graduate students at the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University in Arlington, Virginia.

Editor's Note

Begin communiqué...

Greetings and welcome Unrest readers worldwide.

Welcome to the third issue of Unrest Magazine. Issue Three contains a great selection of pieces by guest contributors and Unrest authors. Erin McKee starts us off with a timely discussion on the implications of the *Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project* decision for individuals and groups who provide humanitarian aid and conflict resolution training to groups designated as terrorist. This is an issue of pressing importance not only within the field of peace and conflict studies, but to all those invested in promoting human rights. World-renowned poet Irakli Kakabadze graces our pages with two provoking pieces in our Right Hemisphere section. Alex Scheinman takes to task Robert Kaplan's vision for the American Empire in *Discourse*. Lane Salter presents a narrative-based critique of Richard's *Disarming Manhood* in this issue's *Banter*. Additional pieces by: Derek Sweetman on the implications of heterogeneous conflict for developing a Critical Conflict Theory; Sarah Rose-Jensen on the topic of reform or revolution for the field; Jay Filipi offers a highly original piece on the use of Lacan's discourses as a tool of conflict resolution; and Michael D. English submits the report on "Graduate Education and Professional Practice in International Peace and Conflict" to a critical reading. In short, we are happy to bring you another exciting issue of Unrest!

For those interested in supporting us, you can follow us on Facebook and/or Twitter. This is the best way to get frequent updates. The Editorial Cell (the Unrest Blog) also contains pieces not featured in the magazine and can be also be accessed through the EC tab. We have also updated our links page with more great resources. If you are interested in link sharing, please email us with your site or suggestions. Previous issues of Unrest can be accessed under the Past Issues tab. Links to the pdf version of each issue are located at the bottom of the table of contents.

Unrest is always on the hunt for authors and collaborators willing to put their critical spin on the world and events. Those interested in submitting material for our next issue please get in touch. The next issue deadline is March 10, 2011 for April publication. For general quires please email unrestmag@gmail.com. Please send submissions to submissions@unrestmag.com

The Unrest Editorial Cell
January 2011

Arrested are the Peacemakers: The Impact of *Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project* on Conflict Resolution Activists

by Erin McKee

In *Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project*,^[i] the Supreme Court upheld 6-3 a federal statute^[ii] that criminalizes, inter alia, individuals and groups who provide humanitarian aid and conflict resolution training to designated terrorist groups. In finding that “material support or resources” includes lawful political advocacy, instructions on how to approach the United Nations for humanitarian relief, and providing general international legal advice, the Court dealt a harsh blow to conflict resolution activists and civil liberties.

The crux of the suit is the statutory construction of the term “material support,” the precise meaning of which under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B has been in dispute for more than a decade. In 1998, the Humanitarian Law Project, along with five other U.S. Tamil interest groups and two citizen activist group members,^[iii] filed for a preliminary injunction of the statute as applied to their prospective speech and activism.^[iv] Petitioners alleged that the statute was unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment for violating Due Process and the First Amendment for violating freedom of speech and association.

The text at issue, “material support or resources” is defined as:

“(1) any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who may be or include oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious materials.

(2) the term “training” or training designed to impart a specific skill, as opposed to general knowledge, and

(3) the term ‘expert advice and assistance’ means advice or assistance derived from scientific, technical, or otherwise specialized knowledge.” 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b).

Humanitarian Law Project (HLP) is a human rights and peace organization dedicated to using international human rights law and humanitarian law to peacefully resolve conflicts.^[v] In this case, HLP sought to teach the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) how to file human rights complaints with the United Nations and conduct peace negotiations with the Turkish government. Petitioners also sought to teach the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) how to present claims to international bodies for tsunami-related relief; to provide legal expertise on peace negotiations with the Sri Lankan government; and to teach general political advocacy skills. The Court found all of these activities to be prohibited under 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B. A conviction under § 2339B results in up to fifteen years in prison and up to \$250,000 in fines (\$500,000 for organizational defendants).

Laws like the “material support” criminal bar not only impede and reverse progress by conflict resolution activists but also threaten all of our civil liberties.

Several organizations, including the ACLU, filed amicus briefs. Petitioners and amici first alleged the statute was “unconstitutionally vague” under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. A statute will be found “void for vagueness” only if conduct forbidden is so clearly undefined it “fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.”^[vi] This is often a difficult hurdle to meet, especially in light of the constitutional avoidance doctrine, which instructs that, where possible, statutes should be interpreted so as to avoid constitutional problems. The fact that Petitioners anticipated their conduct would fall under the statute, hence their request for pre-enforcement review, actually cuts against their argument, and the majority and dissent agreed that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague.

The second challenge under the First Amendment, and the majority’s subsequent ruling, is significantly more troubling for conflict resolution activists and civil libertarians. Despite the plain language of the statute that “nothing in this section shall be construed or applied so as to abridge the exercise of rights guar-

anteed by the First Amendment,” the majority found that the statute’s “material support” bar was unconstitutionally vague. The second challenge under the First Amendment, and the majority’s subsequent ruling, is significantly more troubling for conflict resolution activists and civil libertarians. Despite the plain language of the statute that “nothing in this section shall be construed or applied so as to abridge the exercise of rights guar-

anted under the First Amendment,”[vii] the Court does just that. Under the strict scrutiny test, the Court found that the restriction on speech was the least restrictive means of serving the compelling government interest of national security. Moreover, the type of speech in which Petitioners wished to engage, namely political speech, should be the most protected.[viii] Instead, the majority, written by Chief Justice Roberts, lumps political speech and peace advocacy under the “material support” label.

The majority justifies this decision on the grounds that political advocacy and training are “fungible” commodities in that they free up resources for groups to put toward illegal terrorist ends. Citing no empirical evidence for this assertion and instead relying on a slew of hypotheticals of its own devices, i.e., not proffered by the government in its brief or oral arguments, the Court finds this speculative reasoning strong enough to overcome the First Amendment.[ix] Moreover, neither legislative history nor the plain language of the statute suggests that Congress intended to criminalize peace and humanitarian activists.

Effect on Conflict Resolution Activists

President Jimmy Carter, whose various peace-related activities would likely fall under § 2339B, commented on the holding,

“We are disappointed that the Supreme Court has upheld a law that inhibits the work of human rights and conflict resolution groups. The ‘material support law’—which is aimed at putting an end to terrorism—actually threatens our work and the work of many other peacemaking organizations that must interact directly with groups that have engaged in violence.”[x]

President Carter is clearly right that the decision threatens non-violent conflict resolution organizations on many levels. The most obvious effect of *Holder v. HLP* is that groups who have been providing peace training or humanitarian aid to any of the designated groups will have to cease and desist immediately. For humanitarians and conflict resolution activists like Petitioners, this can mean that years of progress spent building trust and relationships with members of these groups may be quickly reversed as activists are forced to abandon projects for fear of prosecution.

The majority attempted to assuage the harshness of its opinion by “limiting” criminal conduct to that done in “coordination” with the designated terrorist group. At the onset, the Court would do well to remember that the First Amendment protects not only freedom of speech but also freedom of association.

Thus, limiting criminally liable speech to that done in “coordination” hardly wipes clean the stain of unconstitutionality.

Moreover, it is unclear whether the Court provided a workable test for lower courts to follow. Thus, individuals and organizations that wish to continue humanitarian or peace work with a designated terrorist organization will be taking substantial risks. If prosecuted under § 2339B, it is hard to predict how lower courts will rule.

Legal solutions at this point are slim. Groups could attempt to press the limits of activism and if charged under 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B instigate more strategic litigation in an effort to reign in further civil liberties violations against peace activists. Again, this is a risky endeavor. Alternatively, groups could lobby Congress to change the law to expressly allow for the type of non-violent and humanitarian aid Petitioners in *Holder v. HLP* proposed. The Court often advises people to seek legislative remedies if they are unhappy with its decisions. However, the reality is that it would be difficult to move a bill through Congress that appears “soft on terror,” and a critical mass of truly progressive politicians is not going to be elected any time soon.

Message to the International Community

Although the Supreme Court is not the designated organ for foreign affairs, and thus its opinions should not be interpreted as foreign policy, in reality, the international community pays attention. The Court’s ruling in *Holder v. HLP* sends two strong messages. First, that the U.S. does not support global civil society—indeed, here, it criminalizes it. Second, the U.S. is all too willing to strip from its citizens the very freedoms it portends to be fighting for.

Laws like the “material support” criminal bar not only impede and reverse progress by conflict resolution activists but also threaten all of our civil liberties. Every time the law pierces our civil liberties, we should take that deprivation personally. That the type of free speech attacked under this holding is political speech advocating non-violent conflict resolution, ostensibly the type of speech that should be most protected and among the most promoted, shows just how far we have to go and presents yet another obstacle for advocates of peaceful conflict resolution.

[i] 130 S.Ct. 2705 (2010).

[ii] 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.

[iii] The two citizen petitioners were Ralph Fertig, HLP’s president and retired administrative law judge,

and Hagalingam Jeyalingam, Tamil physician born in Sri Land and naturalized in the U.S.

[iv] Note that this is an “as applied” constitutional challenge as distinguished from a “facial challenge.” A facial challenge alleges that a statute in its totality and under all circumstances imaginable is unconstitutional. An “as applied” challenge alleges that a statute or a specific part therein is unconstitutional as applied to petitioner’s speech or conduct.

[v] See Humanitarian Law Project. <http://hlp.home.igc.org>.

[vi] United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 204 (2008).

[vii] 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B(i).

[viii] See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964).

[ix] See Holder v. HLP at 2735, dissent (discussing majority’s speculative reasoning).

[x] ACLU Press Release, “Supreme Court Rules ‘Material Support’ Law Stands.” June 21, 2010. <<http://www.aclu.org/national-security/supreme-court-rules-material-support-law-can-stand>> Accessed Nov. 30, 2010.

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Heterogeneous Conflicts: One Role for Critical Conflict Theory

By Derek Sweetman

One of the goals of Unrest is to investigate the theoretical spaces not commonly addressed in our analysis of contemporary conflict and our attempts to address it. We hope to contribute to the development of Critical Conflict Theory (CCT), which has the opportunity to provide insights traditional conflict theory cannot. This essay argues that heterogeneous conflicts should be a fertile ground for critical work and, in so doing, hopes to point at least some of the CCT work toward this underrepresented area.

In *Conflict and Defense*[i], Kenneth Boulding dedicated a chapter to what he called “heterogeneous conflicts.” These are conflicts in which the parties are not of the same type. Boulding saw the most interesting of these as involving conflicts where one party is an individual and the other a group or organization.[ii] His focus in that particular chapter is primarily on the various processes of socialization through which individual-group conflicts are mediated, in the sociological sense. For Boulding, heterogeneous conflicts are usually instances of conflict between an organization and a member of that organization, but the value of the insight extends much further.

Boulding’s concept, however, did not get carried on in conflict theory beyond *Conflict and Defense*. Traditional conflict theory and conflict resolution seems reluctant to engage the idea of heterogeneous conflict directly. To the extent that “heterogeneous conflict” appears in the conflict literature, it is generally in a different context altogether, such as in Putnam’s use of “homogeneous conflict” and “heterogeneous conflict” to differentiate between boundary and factional disputes in negotiation.[iii] To an extent this should not be surprising, as I have earlier described the tendency of conflict resolution to use the category of “party” to constitute that which it works[iv]. By definition, conflicts occur between “parties” and we see parties as conceptual units that share certain characteristics. The two parties to a conflict may differ significantly in detail, yet they are fundamentally of the same character.

The fallacy of this approach is clear within Boulding’s original conception of heterogeneous con-

flict, but becomes more drastic if we take Boulding’s idea to its logical conclusion. Boulding posits conflict between an individual and an organization as the prototypical heterogeneous conflict. He may have been imagining group members and the group itself, but there is no reason to avoid extending this definition to conflicts between individuals and much larger groups or institutions, such as multinational corporations or governments. A student struggling against a university, a citizen fighting her government, or a customer in a dispute with a global media company all would easily fit within our most basic expectations of conflict, but are very clear examples of conflict between two parties of disparate type. Additionally, these types of interactions challenge some of the assumptions we make about conflict itself.

Take, for example, Roger Fisher’s commonly accepted (although admittedly broad) definition of conflict as “a social situation in which there are perceived incompatibilities in goals or values between two (or more) parties, attempts by the parties to control one another, and antagonistic feelings toward each other.”[v] Heterogeneous conflicts involve incompatibilities in goals or values, attempts to control, and antagonism, but attributing these as “perceptions” or “feelings” seems to overly anthropomorphize institutions and groups. When we say that a company perceives a threat or that a government feels something about its citizens, we are speaking metaphorically, not literally. Similarly, Fisher’s definition should be read literally in the interpersonal sense, but more figuratively as parties move farther from the interpersonal, single-actor ideal. This, however, uncovers one of the weaknesses of traditional conflict theory. Ultimately, it treats every actor (re-labeled as either an in-process “party” or out-of-process “spoiler,” of course) as a human actor, subject to human limitations and predilections.

Traditional conflict theory attempts to define heterogeneous conflicts in ways that make them more manageable within the established framework through two definitional acts, which may be used alone or in tandem. The first of these is to focus on differences of

power instead of differences of type and the second is to approach institutions, governments, and organizations as if they are simply individuals writ large.

The focus on power difference instead of type difference recasts heterogeneous conflicts as “asymmetrical conflicts,” defined as any conflict in which there is a power imbalance between the parties related to the resources that they could bring to bear on the conflict.[vi] In practice, scholars focus on cases where the imbalance is pronounced, since every conflict will have some level of difference between the parties.

The literature of conflict analysis and resolution is robust, but not unified, on the subject of asymmetric conflict. The term was first mentioned in 1974, but has recently become much more common.[vii] There is even a new journal, *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict*, focused specifically on the issue. In general, asymmetry is recognized through the methods used by the less-powerful party, including guerilla tactics or terrorism[viii], the recognition that one party is more powerful than the other[ix] or simply seen in conflicts where relative levels of power are unclear.[x] Some go so far as to say that asymmetric conflicts are causally different than others, in that the “root of the conflict lies not in particular issues or interests that may divide the parties, but in the very structure of who they are and the relationship between them”.[xi] Asymmetric conflicts are said to require simple awareness on the part of practitioners, or in some cases efforts to remove the asymmetry[xii]

These explanations that focus on less unbalanced asymmetries may provide an understanding of heterogeneous conflicts, but I am not confident in this. First, all are built from cases of violent conflict. The majority of heterogeneous conflicts, however, do not include direct (physical) violence. Second, all of these still presume that the imbalance is occurring between groups, which ignores the difficulties of dealing with participants of different essential types.

The alternative within traditional conflict theory is to look at conflicts involving large organizations or institutions and individuals as if the difference is negligible and that it can be treated as an agent problem. This could mean treating parties as if they were people, such as the “anthropomorphic conception of the state,” which posits that states can be seen as people.[xiii] It could also mean focusing on the agents of the institution or organization as if they actually are the institution or organization. This does a double disservice, first because it treats the groups and systems as something they are not and second, because it ignores the strong extent to which the actions of the agent are not his own. Any conflict resolution practitioner who has tried to rely on a presumption of basic human needs to resolve a dispute with their cable company should readily recognize that assuming the

person on the other end of the phone has the agency to act as a full person is a mistake. However, it is important to note that treating corporations as people is not a fiction in legal practice. The push toward “corporate personhood” has continued in the American legal system.[xiv] The point of this, though, is not to make these conflicts more amenable to conflict resolution, but to make them more amenable to adjudication within the legal system. Additionally, we need to realize that whatever use this may have within the legal system, corporate personhood leaks into other venues in ways that undermine the lives of real people.[xv]

These are level-of-analysis solutions to the problem that conflict occurs on multiple levels between parties on multiple levels. We may use the lens of the individual to explain group conflict, we may use the lens of the unified party, or we may break down the parties into their subgroups. While this seems reasonable, it reinforces the notion that conflicts occur primarily between parties of a similar fundamental type. While heterogeneous conflicts have crept into international relations and security studies through the analysis of asymmetrical warfare and the relations of states (the US) and transnational networks (Al-Qaeda), there appears to have been little work done on heterogeneous conflicts in other venues, even though those are actually much more plentiful. On the mundane end of the spectrum, this would include individuals (acting as consumers) in conflict with multinational corporations. A more interesting manifestation would be the conflict between an individual and the economic system in which they live. In the end, we are left to imagine what it even means to label both sides in a heterogeneous conflict as “parties,” when they share so little.

One reasonable alternative is to avoid calling the phenomena we are labeling “heterogeneous conflict” conflicts at all. This sets aside conflict theory entirely and focus on the behavior of the much smaller party in heterogeneous conflicts as either resistance or grievance, such as James C. Scott’s work on individual peasant resistance[xvi] or in business managerial studies that examine complaints over time to map the “grievant’s career,”[xvii] where “conflicts” are reframed into “complaints.” I would like to believe, however, that there is utility in retaining the lens of conflict in examining these disputes.

Once we jettison the presumption that conflict is exclusively a human-human phenomenon, whether those humans are acting alone or in groups, it is easy to recognize that much of what is discussed as tension between the individual and larger systems or, more directly, “oppression,” should also be recognized as conflict. While this may seem an overly-intellectualized model, consider the conflicts described by Lisa Dodson in *The Moral Underground: How Ordinary Americans*

Subvert an Unfair Economy. [xviii] Dodson's stories of workers and managers recognizing the extent to which they live within a system that seeks to undermine their goals and taking action to undermine the functioning of that system appear on one hand to be obviously conflict behavior and on the other as something traditional conflict theory could only process by reframing into a dispute between employees and bosses.

These are the conflicts that we all experience as we attempt to assert agency in the world, but they are not well-served by traditional conflict theory. What we need, then, are new tools derived from non-conflict work on systems, oppression, hegemony, and the like and applied to the resolution of conflict.

What do we gain by approaching these issues as conflicts? Conflict resolution is agency-oriented. It is premised on the idea that we can do something about systems of violence; we can change the world. It is not just critical reflection, but a course of action. In its most ambitious forms, it aims at nonviolent transformation of our social reality, not the violent, adversarial overthrow of groups or classes. A clear understanding of the conflicts in which we are embedded is vital for this enterprise, as are new tools for addressing them. Critical Conflict Theory holds the promise of aiming us in the right direction. It is possible that the issue of how to address heterogeneous conflicts is the fundamental question of Critical Conflict Theory. At least, it is an important place to start.

[i] Kenneth Ewart Boulding, *Conflict and Defense: A General Theory* (Harper, 1962).

[ii] *Ibid.*, 167.

[iii] Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," in *Double-edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics*, ed. Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam (University of California Press, 1993), 445.

[iv] Derek Sweetman, "The Benign Subjugation of Conflict Resolution," *Unrest*, no. 0 (June 2010): 24-33.

[v] Ronald J. Fisher, "Intergroup Conflict," in *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice*, ed. Morton Deutsch, Peter T. Coleman, and Eric Colton Marcus (John Wiley and Sons, 2006), 178.

[vi] T. V. Paul, *Asymmetric Conflicts* (Cambridge University Press, 1994), 3.

[vii] Robert M. Cassidy, *Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror* (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006), 23.

[viii] Eugene B. Skolnikoff, "Responding to asymmetric threat: The dual-use strategy.," *Dynamics of Asymmetrical Conflict* 1, no. 1 (March 2008): 42-47.

[ix] Ekaterina Stepanova, *Terrorism in Asymmetrical Conflict* (Oxford University Press US, 2008).

[x] James W. McAuley, Catherine McGlynn, and Jon Tonge, "Conflict resolution in asymmetric and symmetric situations: Northern Ireland as a case study.," *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict* 1, no. 1 (March 2008): 88-102.

[xi] Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, and Hugh Miall, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, 2nd ed. (Polity, 2005), 21.

[xii] Louis Kriesberg, "Changing conflict asymmetries constructively.," *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict* 2, no. 1 (March 2009): 4-22.

[xiii] Maja Zehfuss, *Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality* (Cambridge University Press, 2002), 89.

[xiv] Katie J Thoennes, "Frankenstein Incorporated: The Rise of Corporate Power and Personhood in the United States," *Hamline Law Review* 28 (2004): 203.

[xv] See, for example, Elana Shever, "Engendering the Company: Corporate Personhood and the "Face" of an Oil Company in Metropolitan Buenos Aires," *PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review* 33, no. 1 (5, 2010): 26-46.

[xvi] James C. Scott, *Weapons of the Weak* (Yale University Press, 1985).

[xvii] Brian S Klaas and David C Thomas, "The stability of individual grievance behavior: An examination of assumptions about grievance activity," *Journal of Managerial Issues* 6, no. 4 (Winter 1994): 393.

[xviii] Lisa Dodson, *The Moral Underground: How Ordinary Americans Subvert an Unfair Economy* (The New Press, 2009).

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Revolution Revisited: Re-reading Rosa Luxemburg's Reform or Revolution

by Sarah-Rose Jensen

In *Reform or Revolution*, Luxemburg (1900, reprinted 1970) argues that the act of reform within the capitalist system, regardless of its potential to benefit the workers, is ultimately a destructive act because reform serves to extend and perpetuate the capitalist system. Revolution is the only possible way to truly change the system, though in this work she does not indicate whether or not non-violent revolution is possible. This question is key for the field of conflict analysis and resolution because whether we agree with Luxemburg or not indicates how we conceptualize the field and how we approach conflict. Are we attempting to mitigate or manage the most violent conflict, to shift it to less violent forms, to stop the killing; or are we working to be catalysts for greater change and focused beyond ending physical violence? There seems to be merit to both approaches – clearly no one interested in resolving conflict would argue that allowing people to die is a good thing. However, it is quite clear that imperfect resolutions can result in more people dying in the long term, so resolution for resolutions sake is also not the answer. The Rwandan genocide, which resulted in part from the failure to resolve an earlier conflict through the Arusha Accords makes this clear. In re-reading *Reform or Revolution* it is helpful to apply Luxemburg's ideas to something other than revolution in the sense of a proletarian uprising, and to instead look at how the questions affects conflict resolution.

While some street protests have been effective in recent years, such as the Ukrainian Orange Revolution which led to tangible changes in the government, there is little indication that the masses will rise up against government forces and seize control in most developed countries. Given the stagnation of the proletariat in these countries, we must ask whether revolution is still possible. Some of Marx's putative followers, such as Bernstein, suggested that in lieu of violent rebellion, the system could be reformed and

moved toward socialism through the introduction of more worker-friendly practices. Luxemburg roundly rejected this proposition. Any attempt at reform was simply an excuse to prop up a fundamentally corrupt system doomed to eventually fail.

Reform or Revolution is a direct response to the work of Bernstein and his calls for socialist reform under capitalism. In arguing against Bernstein's ideas of reform, Luxemburg suggests his propositions were fundamentally system-driven. Something that is created within the capitalist system by default serves to bolster the system. While reforms might benefit the working class in the short-term, they ultimately serve to perpetuate a system ultimately opposed to the interests of the working class. It is first necessary to clarify what Luxemburg meant by the capitalist system or economy. She makes it clear that neither she nor Bernstein were speaking of the same system Marx was speaking of, with individuals bosses and capitalists oppressing individual workers. The growth of industry under capitalism creates an increasingly administrator-based system rather than one based on individual bosses. Luxemburg quotes Schmidt on

This is the crisis the field of conflict resolution finds itself in – which goal are we working toward? Are the methods we are using appropriate for getting us there? Are we actually effecting change or are we just making surface modifications, as Luxemburg suggests?

this point, suggesting the move to an administrator-based version of capitalism diminishes the power of those in authority. Both Schmidt and Bernstein saw this as a good thing – the individual capitalists would lose their power and become administrators. Schmidt said, “the trade-union struggle for hours and wages and the political struggle for reforms will lead to a progressively more extensive control over the conditions of production” (in Luxemburg 1970, 28). Bernstein took this further, and suggested that this diminishing of power, along with a democratization of politics and the abilities of trade unions to demand reforms, could gradually shift the economic system toward socialism. Luxemburg countered that none of these institutions actually have the power to suppress the system, as it is self-serving no matter who is running it. The diffu-

sion of power through reform meant more power resided in the system in the guise of administration than in the hands of the people who were supposed to benefit from the rise of administrative class.

For evidence for her idea that capitalism was expanding, not retreating, Luxemburg offered the example of credit. The credit system allows more people to consume in the market and causes capitalism to become “socialized” in “the framework of the capitalist society” (50). On the surface, this would seem to be a good thing, because it served to flatten the hierarchical tendencies of capital. More people were able to act as “capitalists” which diminished the power of the individual capitalist. In Bernstein’s view credit shifted more power into the hands of people who would otherwise be workers. In Luxemburg’s view it put the power into the hands of the administrators (and thus more securely in the system itself). In a Marxian sense, this could be seen as creating another layer of alienation, separating the worker as the producer even farther from the fruits of their labor. Though Luxemburg does not put it in these terms, credit was also another means of false liberation, because it allowed people to feel as though they were participating in the system as subjects rather than objects, but in reality they were only losing more control over their own autonomy to the system. Credit was a “means of adaptation” in the capitalist system, and while it did allow more people access to capital, it did not reform the system in the way that Bernstein argued that it could (Luxemburg 1970, 25). Rather than limiting the contradictions in the capitalist economy, as Bernstein believed, Luxemburg argued the expansion of the capitalist economy was also increasing the contradictions within it. Bernstein wanted to work toward a system free of crises, but Luxemburg believed that the crises are fundamental to the system and that to eliminate crises, the capitalist system itself had to be eliminated. It is not just credit that serves to expand and perpetuate the capitalist economy; the very reforms that workers and trade-unions agitate for can serve the same function. Luxemburg uses her wonderful “socialist lemonade” example to highlight this point (39). In her view, revisionist tendencies deny the contradictions inherent in the capitalist economy, and this combined with a rejection of the “comprehension by the working class of the unavoidability of the suppression of these contradictions through a social transformation,” which serves to prevent realization of the class viewpoint and socialism (42). To approach reform like Bernstein not only ignored the realities of crises and contradictions, but it also ignored the realities of the class structure:

It is not true that socialism will arise automatically from the struggle of the working class. Socialism will be the consequence of (1) the growing contradictions of the capitalist economy, and (2) the comprehen-

sion by the working class of the unavoidability of the suppression of these contradictions through a social transformation. When, in the manner of revisionism, the first condition is denied and the second rejected, the labor movement finds itself reduced to a simple cooperative and reformist movement. We move here in a straight line toward the total abandonment of a class viewpoint (42-3).

However, there are obstacles to organizing the workers and breaking down the system. While the decline of capitalism is inevitable, this decline also makes it harder for workers and trade-unions to organize, because “the market will be less favorable to the sellers of labor power because the demand for labor power will increase at a slower rate and labor supply more rapidly...” (Luxemburg 1970, 31). In Luxemburg’s view the labor unions were not going to be able to organize the people under these new conditions. The trade unions were serving primarily to allow the workers to participate in the capitalist system, rather than giving them a mechanism to escape the system. She says, “But the principal function of trade unions... consists in providing the workers with a means of realizing the capitalist law of wages, that is to say, the sale of their labor power at current market prices” (Luxemburg 1970, 28). Rather than a revolution led by the unions, she sought a revolution led by the working class itself, primarily serve the interest of the employer and the system.

She argues quite adeptly against political reform:

That is why people who pronounce themselves in favor of the methods of legislative reform *in place of and in contradistinction* to the conquest of political power and social revolution, do not really choose a more tranquil, calmer and slower road to the same goal, but a different goal. Instead of taking a stand for the establishment of a new society they take a stand for surface modification of the old society (67).

This is the crisis the field of conflict resolution finds itself in – which goal are we working toward? Are the methods we are using appropriate for getting us there? Are we actually effecting change or are we just making surface modifications, as Luxemburg suggests?

In reading Luxemburg, it is easy to understand the pessimism in some of those who came after her. The capitalist economy is designed to be self-sustaining. If it can not be changed through reforms, as she firmly believes, then that only leaves revolution. However, as she also makes clear, revolution becomes more difficult as capitalism expands, because it is more difficult for the workers to organize themselves effectively. While Marxists believe decline and an ultimate crisis in capitalism are inevitable, which Luxemburg says

to reject this proposition is to reject the very core notions of socialism, it does beg the questions “What next?” The socialist ideal seems less and less likely as workers are increasingly alienated. A drastic change to the system does seem inevitable at some point, but it is not clear that a worker-driven socialist society is most likely immediate result of such a revolution.

As would-be conflict resolvers, where does this leave us? One potential model is to consider structural violence as another type of crisis. Luxemburg suggests that crises are fundamental to the current economic system and can not be eliminated unless the system undergoes revolution. Given the current climate of globalization and the rule of the corporation, it is unlikely that worker exploitation, environmental degradation, street riots, human trafficking, or any of the other evils of the capitalist world are going to ever be truly resolved. However, in working to change the system we can start calling them what they are – crises, or manifestations of the exploitation and violence inherent in capitalism. To borrow an idea from Paulo Friere, our goal should not be just to end violence, but help people understand that they are engaged in a system of violence and oppression. Perhaps there is an intermediary step that Luxemburg did not voice explicitly – we do not have to either embrace reformism or simply allow violence to continue while waiting for the inevitable revolution. We can hasten revolutionary change by helping those against who violence is being perpetrated, and perhaps those perpetrating it, as they are locked in the same struggle, that the problem is not the single instance of violence, be it structural or overt, but the system of capitalism.

All quotes and references are from Luxemburg, R. (1970). *Reform of Revolution*. London: Pathfinder.

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Where's the just enemy of the American empire when you need it? A Schmittean response to Robert D. Kaplan by **Alex D. Scheinman**

In an editorial in the *Washington Post* titled “Where’s the American empire when we need it?” (Kaplan, n.d.), Robert D. Kaplan worries about the recent decline in America’s capacity to respond to events that threaten to destabilize the international security system. Kaplan is concerned that the slow but steady erosion of American power will leave the current administration little choice but to recalibrate its international security commitments to better reflect America’s increasing inability to effectively fulfill its security obligations as the lone superpower in the post-Cold War era. If the United States is compelled to vacate some of its international security responsibilities, then for Kaplan the important question is who among the other powers in the system will assume the obligations that the United States can no longer fulfill? Kaplan begins to answer this question with the less than sanguine observation that not all empires are built alike. His fear is that while rising powers such as China and India will gladly reap the benefits of their expanding geopolitical influence, these same nations are unlikely to adopt an approach to international security that operates on the assumption that with an increase in power comes an increase in responsibility. This potential threat to the security of the international system is the source of considerable unease for individuals like Kaplan who tend to view international politics through the power-based lens of the realist school(s) of International Relations[i]. That is not to suggest that realists of Kaplan’s persuasion have a monopoly on international security concerns, but it is to suggest that the source of Kaplan’s unease can be traced to the inability of realists to both find their bearings in the post-Cold War era and arrive at policy prescriptions that can effectively address security problems in an age where the risk environment has become globalized.

Kaplan illustrates this difficulty for realists in his description of the tough choices facing policy makers in the United States. On the one hand, he notes that the United States is in the midst of a seemingly inexorable decline of its power relative to other nations in the international system. Given this state of affairs, Kaplan is quite sympathetic to the current administration’s desire to reduce its role as the world’s policeman. Indeed, from a realist perspective, a foreign policy decision aimed at promoting the national interest by reducing its international commitments for the purpose of conserving the nation’s dwindling resources seems to meet the very definition of political rationality. On the other hand, if the new world order that is emerging in the wake of America’s decline as the global hegemon is populated by a number of regional powers, and one or a few of these powers choose to operate as free-riders on the international security system, then, Kaplan fears, any reduction in America’s commitments to international security will create a vacuum that will expose the United States in particular, and international society in general, to grave security

risks. Taken together, the dilemma for the United States as described by Kaplan is that it chooses either to slow down its rate of decline as a world power by reducing its security commitments, a choice that would expose the international system to higher levels of risk, or it chooses to maintain its current level of security commitments and continues to pay the price that all overextended powers pay. These are difficult and rather unpalatable options for Kaplan, as he doesn't believe that either choice promotes the long-term interests of the United States. If forced to choose between these two undesirable options, Kaplan seems reluctantly to prefer the latter. However, as indicated in the wistful question that he poses to open the editorial – "Where's the American empire when we need it?" – we see that Kaplan would prefer a third solution to this dilemma: an American empire that has the wherewithal to maintain its international security commitments without suffering the fate of empires past.

Of course, while an American empire capable of assuming the responsibilities of a global Leviathan would conceptually resolve the concerns raised by Kaplan, his invocation of a solution that simply wishes away the problem that America is no longer in a position to assume those responsibilities, is a perfect illustration of the inability of political realists to find their bearings at a time like the present when the power structure of the global order is itself in flux. Nevertheless, to paraphrase Kaplan's claim, as noted above, that not all empires are built alike, it can also be said that not all political realists are cut from the same cloth. Indeed, a strong counterpoint within the tradition of political realism can be found in the work of the controversial figure of the former Weimar and Nazi jurist, Carl Schmitt. Whereas Kaplan's diagnosis of contemporary international politics leads him to the conclusion that global security is best achieved if a unipolar power structure emerges in the post-Cold War era, Schmitt's political philosophy leads him to an altogether different conclusion. Namely, Schmitt believed that not only was a multipolar world order preferable to a unipolar world order, but that rather than promoting security and peace, a unipolar world order was more likely to create the conditions for a global state of emergency that would usher in a new era of unregulated and unlimited warfare. While even a cursory engagement with Schmitt's prolific output is not possible in this limited space, a brief consideration of just a few of the themes raised in his work can help us to open a conceptual space in which Kaplan's prescription for world order can be critically assessed by helping us to understand Schmitt's concerns about the inherent dangers of a unipolar world order.

Perhaps the most well known of Schmitt's contributions to political thought is his claim that the constitutive feature of the political is the friend/enemy distinction (1996, 26). In order to understand the specific meaning and function this distinction has for Schmitt, it is necessary to understand how he differentiates the friend/enemy distinction from other constitutive distinctions such as good/bad, beautiful/ugly, and profitable/unprofitable, constitutive distinctions that gives rise to the ethical, aesthetic, and economic orders, respectively. As Sergei Prozorov suggests (2007), there are two important senses in which Schmitt distinguishes the constitutive distinction of the political (the friend/enemy distinction) from the constitutive distinctions that comprise the social order. First, for Schmitt the constitutive distinction of the political is the very condition of possibility of all order as such. This means that the positivity of all social orders, whether legal, moral, aesthetic, or economic

owe their existence, in part, to a constitutive outside. As a consequence, if the political is presupposed by any and all orders, then, of course, the corollary is that in the absence of the political, there can be no order. Second, and just as importantly, Schmitt's understanding of the friend/enemy distinction is not defined by the content of any of the other constitutive distinctions (e.g., "friend" is not defined as beautiful, profitable, or good and "enemy" is not defined as ugly, bad, or wasteful). Indeed, the political is not defined by any content at all, but instead is defined in terms of an intensity of an "association or dissociation of human beings" (1996, 38) that, consistent with the existential character of Schmitt's political thought, simply is.

From this existential and hence non-normative criterion for establishing the friend/enemy distinction, comes a conception of the political enemy that is critically important to Schmitt's claims concerning the conditions of possibility of arriving at a relatively peaceful and stable international order. It is the conception of the political enemy as a *justus hostis*, an equal and just enemy that comes into being, Schmitt argues, around the same time that we see the emergence of the modern-nation state (and modern politics) in the wake of the dissolution of the political authority of the church (Odysseos, 126-7). For Schmitt, the importance of this new conception of the political enemy was that it marked a revolutionary transformation in the conduct of war. Specifically, this transformation was marked by the transition from the just war doctrine that he believed was ascendant in the historical era preceding the emergence of the Westphalian state-system. Schmitt argued that whereas the just war led to inhumane and unlimited wars of conviction wherein parties aimed to annihilate their enemies because one does not make peace with an unjust enemy, the concept of the *justus hostis* gives war an institutional framework that humanizes the conduct of war because the political enemy is now treated as a just enemy with whom one can make peace.

This concept of the *justus hostis* was central to the establishment of the *jus publicum Europaeum* (JPE), the public international law that Schmitt believed was responsible for the relative peace and stability among the sovereign states of Europe from the time of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 up to the collapse of the JPE in 1914. According to Schmitt, the JPE is the first *nomos* of the earth: an international, legal, and, most importantly, a global spatial order that regulates the political life of sovereign European states for nearly three centuries. As Chris Brown notes (2007, 61), Schmitt's account of the JPE should not be confused with the idea of international law that is typically associated with political liberalism. Indeed, Schmitt's entire oeuvre is in many respects a sustained defense of the friend/enemy distinction from what he sees as liberalism's effacement of the political and hence of order as such. To put it simply, in the liberal conception of domestic and international law, all political entities are legitimized by the norms of the legal system, a conception that gives rise to the familiar phrase 'no one stands above the law'. From a Schmittian perspective, however, all regulative orders, legal and otherwise, are legitimized by a sovereign political decision, and because this sovereign decision is itself the very condition of possibility of order, we can say, as Luoma-aho aptly phrases it, "the sovereign stands above the law of the land" (2007, 38).

This inversion of political liberalism's reverence for and dependence on the institutionalization of legal norms for the maintenance of order into a political deci-

sionism wherein the possibility of order is seen to rest with the sovereign's decision to identify who is the friend and who is the enemy, helps us to make sense of the famous line that opens his *Political Theology* "sovereign is he who decides on the exception". Moreover, it also helps us to understand the nature of the concrete and spatial ordering that Schmitt saw as constitutive of the first global order (nomos) of the earth, the JPE.

If, as Schmitt believes, all institutional orders presuppose the concept of the political and the concept of the political presupposes the friend/enemy distinction, then there is the question of who decides on this distinction. For Schmitt, the decision is made by the sovereign. The sovereign is a quasi-transcendental concept that stands both inside and outside the political order. He is outside the political order in the sense that he constitutes it by deciding who is a friend and who is an enemy of the state, and he is inside in the sense that he is the titular head of that very same order. Given this understanding of the sovereign decision and its relation to political order, there remains the question concerning the nature of the exception. Broadly speaking, for Schmitt the exception is simply that which defines the rule. If there were no exceptions, there would be no need for rules, for laws, or for order. This explains Schmitt's claim that liberalism's belief in equality under the law, a form of jurisprudence that countenances no exceptions, is entirely inimical to the maintenance of order. In its concrete application in politics, the sovereign decision on the exception is the declaration of a state of emergency in which the rule of law is suspended in order to preserve it^[ii]. In domestic politics the decision on the exception is aimed at dealing with the enemy within. Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus during the Civil War, Roosevelt's internment of the Japanese during World War II, and the numerous invocations of Article 48 during the troubled years of the Weimar Republic are all examples of the sovereign decision on exception. In each case, the extra-legal treatment of the exception may vary from one polity to another, but in all cases the label of *justus hostis* is denied.

This brings us to the question of the sovereign decision on exception as it relates to international relations. In particular, we are interested in looking at how the exception plays a constitutive role in Schmitt's understanding of the JPE as the first truly global order (nomos) of the earth. As mentioned above, Schmitt claims that a shift from the just war doctrine to the doctrine of the just enemy, the *justus hostis*, was decisive in the transition from the unregulated wars of annihilation that ravaged Europe prior to the Treaty of Westphalia to the more limited and humane wars that occurred between sovereign states for the nearly three centuries during which European international politics were regulated by the JPE. Whether or not the historical record supports Schmitt's claim about the humanization and limitation of war in Europe under the JPE, the question remains as to why Schmitt believes that a pact of mutual recognition among sovereign European states constitutes a global order rather than simply a European order. The answer to this question lies in Schmitt's understanding of the 'nomos of the earth' not as an abstract legal order, but as a legal order that is territorially or spatially defined: i.e., "law is law only in a particular location" (2003, 98). Thus, a condition of possibility for the rule of law to effectively regulate conduct, in both domestic and international contexts, is that the legal-political order be tied to a distinct geopolitical territory. Moreover, if we recall that

Schmitt understands the exception as the definition of the rule, then a further condition of possibility for a legal-political limitation and humanization of war is the very literal drawing of a line in the sand in order to designate a territorial zone in which the rule of law in Europe has no application. For Schmitt, that line emerges with the discovery of the New World in 1492, a geopolitical space in which “for want of any limits to war, only the law of the stronger applied” (2003, 94). Seen from this perspective, the New World becomes the exception to the legal-political order of the JPE. It is the constitutive outside of an interior geopolitical space (the Old World) that has successfully bracketed, Schmitt argues, the war of all against all from contaminating the conduct of interstate relations on European soil. To contemporary ears, the creation of a lawless zone wherein sovereign states are free to pursue their struggle for power without limitation (even if this struggle results in genocide), in order to make possible a zone of limited and humane warfare, does not seem like a bargain that anyone with the slightest concern for social justice would consider striking.

Nevertheless, notwithstanding the inherent risks that accompany efforts to appropriate the political thought but not the politics of a controversial figure like Schmitt, there are two aspects of his thought discussed above that offer a valuable critical perspective from which to view contemporary efforts to establish a secure global system, a new *nomos* of the earth, for the post-Cold War era. These are 1) his identification of the concept of the *justus hostis* with the golden age of international relations as opposed to the just war doctrine which he believes creates the conditions for unlimited and unregulated warfare and 2) his understanding of the legal-political order of the JPE as a global order that presupposes an internally differentiated geopolitical space. As will be discussed below, each of these aspects of his thought reveal a uniquely pluralistic thinker, a political pluriversalist, whose thought not only draws our attention to the limitations associated with Kaplan’s preferred solution to the problem of global security, but draws our attention to what Schmitt sees as the limitations associated with any solution to the problem of global security – including those advanced by the cosmopolitan school of conflict resolution – that embraces a monistic or universal conception of the *nomos*. In order to help us understand how the pluralistic underpinnings of Schmitt’s thought can be appropriated to provide both a critique of, and an alternative to, the solution to the problem of global security advanced by Kaplan, we will juxtapose Kaplan’s preference for a unipolar world order (where the American empire sits at the head of the table) with Schmitt’s preference for a multipolar world order that establishes – as he believed it had during the time of the JPE[iii] – a connection between a legal-political order regulated by the doctrine of the just enemy with a concrete spatial ordering that clarifies the rules of application for that very doctrine, i.e., it meets Schmitt’s criterion that “law is law only in a particular location” (2003, 98).

To begin, let’s briefly look at two of the features of Schmitt’s political thought that help to explain why he prefers a multipolar to a unipolar world order. First, recall that for Schmitt the very condition of possibility for any semblance of order, political or otherwise, rests on the friend/enemy distinction. Therefore, a Schmittian solution to the problem of global order is by definition a pluralistic solution as it requires the existence of at least two political entities[iv] (at least one collective “us” and one collective “them”) both of whom must recognize one another as a just and equal

enemy if the struggle for power is to be prevented from dissolving into unregulated and unlimited warfare.

Second, and related, is Schmitt's well known criticism of the way in which he believes that political liberalism advances a universalistic ideology that wraps itself in the concept of 'humanity' in the hopes of delegitimizing and then overcoming the distinctly political barriers that the Westphalian state system, regulated by the JPE, posed, to what Schmitt believed, were liberalism's underlying goals for a new global economic order. In *The Concept of the Political*, Schmitt made two arguments, one logical the other political-practical, against liberalism's use of the concept of humanity that bear directly on his preference for a multipolar rather than a unipolar world order. The first of these arguments was to simply point out that liberalism's claim that it fights its political enemies in the name of 'humanity' is logically impossible as the very concept of a unified humanity excludes the possibility for a human enemy: the concept of humanity in a political context, writes Schmitt, "excludes the concept of the enemy, because the enemy does not cease to be a human being" (1976, 54). The second, and more important argument Schmitt makes is the political-practical one. To wit, Schmitt understands liberalism's embrace of the concept of humanity as nothing more than a sleight of hand that is intended to mask the particular economic interests of the state by identifying the state's interests with the interests of humanity. However, in the context of a political world where war remains an ever-present possibility of human existence, Schmitt argues that when the liberal state "fights its political enemy in the name of humanity" (*ibid.*), the enemy is necessarily defined as inhuman, as the unjust enemy with whom one cannot make peace. As a result, Schmitt argues that the liberal state's embrace of the concept of humanity in the early half of the 20th century was, for all intents and purposes, a political act aimed at transcending the political as such (i.e., overcoming the friend/enemy distinction). However, what Schmitt reveals in his interpretation of this period of world history is that rather than transcending the political with a war to end all wars, the liberal state simply intensified the constitutive distinction of the political, unleashing a particularly destructive form of politics that marked the end of the era of the *justus hostis* and the return of the just war doctrine to the European continent and beyond.

What is clear from the discussion above is that Schmitt's preference for a multipolar world order stems from his unwavering belief that the political world is a pluriverse, not a universe (1976, 52). From Schmitt's perspective, whether a global order is unipolar in the sense of a world government that ostensibly represents the unification of the global community, or, alternatively, as Kaplan prefers, unipolar in the sense that a single political entity assumes the responsibility of political decisions -- of deciding on the exception -- for a plurality of apolitical communities, neither alters the fundamental fact of the political: as long as we live in a political world there will always be a plurality of political entities, where some of these entities will be friends and some will be enemies. For Schmitt, the ever-present danger of unipolarity is that a single political authority will inevitably identify itself as the friend of humankind and its enemies as the enemies of humankind. The risk of this state of affairs is that when the discourse of humanity gets integrated into the discourse of the political, all political opposition and resistance to the prevailing authority tends to be treated as opposed to humanity in general rather than opposed to a particular

form or life or political rule. That is, the space for legitimate and justified opposition to a unipolar legal-political order is more or less foreclosed. As a consequence, we can see that for Schmitt one of the primary reasons that he prefers a multipolar world order is that in a unipolar world the concept of the *justus hostis* fades from the political horizon and with it the capacity of the political to humanize and limit the conduct of war. In its place the just war doctrine, along with its wars of annihilation, returns.

That we're living in a time where the just war doctrine is in political ascendancy hardly needs justification. In the name of national and/or international security, the United States (along with the coalition of the willing) has declared that they will not negotiate with terrorists or the rogue states that support their operations. Those parties have been designated as the unjust enemy with whom peace cannot be made. In Schmittian terminology, one can say that the United States' War on Terror is a war of annihilation on the exception to the rule, and although there is little doubt that as a national security issue Schmitt would have been highly sympathetic to this position, the global nature of this war would have caused him considerable discomfort. Notwithstanding the fact that Schmitt was perfectly comfortable, too comfortable with wars of annihilation, as demonstrated by his understanding of the role that the lawless zone of the New World played in civilizing the institution of war in Europe during the time of the JPE, he was only comfortable insofar as those wars of annihilation were geopolitically, that is, spatially, circumscribed. It is here that we encounter the other aspect of the pluralistic underpinnings of Schmitt's thought that reinforces his arguments for a multipolar *nomos* of the earth. This aspect of his thought is the spatial corollary to his reflections on the problems that inevitably arise when a political entity invokes the concept of humanity for specifically political purposes. In such cases, the political enemy loses its moral standing as a human being and becomes, in the eyes of those on the side of humanity, justifiably subject to extra-legal processes including torture and murder. However, whereas during the era of the JPE this state of exception was confined to the New World, in the current geopolitical climate there is no 'safe haven' for the political enemy of humanity. That is, there is no geopolitical space that stands as the exception to, and the condition of possibility for, a unipolar legal-political order, because in the post-Cold War era the legal-political order has become unmoored from any specific location precisely so it can function effectively in any and all locations. When coupled with both the political appropriation of the concept of humanity and the ascendancy of the just war doctrine, this lack of an internally differentiated geopolitical space would have been of grave concern to Schmitt if he were alive today. In Schmittian terms, we can say that in the absence of a geopolitical designation for both the rule (international order) and the exception (the perceived threats to this order), the war of all against all is no longer bounded in the territory of the exception, but instead becomes a global condition of unending, unregulated, and unlimited warfare.

Of course, Kaplan would probably respond to these arguments in favor of a multipolar world by suggesting that since the end of the Cold War, the nature of the threats to the security, and perhaps even viability, of the international system (e.g., the nexus between weapons proliferating states and transnational terrorism) have rendered the idea of a territorial exception to the rule and the concept of the just and equal enemy obsolete. The gist of Kaplan's argument would simply be that if any one

of the powers in a multipolar world order failed to meet their security obligations the entire international system would be exposed to an intolerable level of risk because in a globalized risk environment it's extremely difficult to contain the threat in the region where it originated. For example, if China is responsible for securitizing East Asia and it fails to commit the necessary resources to monitor the North Korea's weapons proliferating programs, eventually that gap in the system could result in the detonation of a WMD on U.S. or European soil. On the face of it, the argument advanced by Kaplan here is an extremely powerful argument for a unipolar world.

Nevertheless, when the logic of this argument is viewed in the light of Schmitt's critique of unipolarity, we find that one of the central planks on which this argument rests may be on considerably weaker ground than first appears. This is the argument that whether we are dealing with rogue states, terrorist networks, or some combination of the two, there are actors on the international stage that, if given the means, would seize on any and every opportunity to inflict as much damage on the West as humanly possible. Rightly or wrongly, these actors have been labeled the enemies of the civilized world (i.e., the enemies of humanity) and the normal rules of conduct in warfare have been suspended until these enemies are annihilated. In Schmittian terms, these political enemies have lost their moral standing as members of the civilized world and as such they represent the very personification of the unjust enemy with whom peace cannot be made. Kaplan's preference for a unipolar world ultimately stems from his belief that the real and potential threat these actors pose to the West provides a sufficient, and perhaps from his perspective, necessary reason for the United States to maintain its global hegemony in the post-Cold War era. Notwithstanding the fact that Schmitt would almost certainly have considered it the height of irresponsibility if the United States had failed to declare a state of emergency in order to remove any legal and/or moral constraints on the prosecution of the War on Terror, his critique of unipolarity illuminates a fundamental paradox at the very foundation of Kaplan's logic. Namely, Schmitt directs our attention to the fact that in a unipolar world order the monistic face of the political does not eliminate, but instead simply masks the fact that there is a political pluriverse beneath the appearance of political universe. That is, the condition of unipolarity does not eliminate political antagonisms. Indeed, as Schmitt argues, in the condition of unipolarity the political enemy becomes identified with the enemy of civilization, the global order, and/or humanity, and as a consequence the figurative and literal space for legitimate political opposition to the prevailing power structure is foreclosed. If the normal political and legal channels for expressing grievances are foreclosed, then we should not be surprised when political opposition to the prevailing order turns to forms of violence that a 'civilized' society would consider beyond the pale[v]. While this is not to suggest that terrorism and the War on Terror can simply be explained by the fact that we are currently living in a unipolar world, it is to suggest, as indicated by Schmitt's reflections on unipolarity, that Kaplan's solution may in fact create a paradox wherein his solution to the problem of order may be at the very heart of, or at the very least a contributing factor in, the problem he seeks to address.

The above engagement with Schmitt's political thought should give considerable pause to those realists like Kaplan who are under the impression that the risks associated with trusting other powers to share in the securitizing of the international system are potentially far greater than the risks associated with the establishment

of a unipolar world order. Nevertheless, while Schmitt's political thought can provide us with an important critical intellectual tool to assess our current political condition, the politics that issue from his thought – especially his countenance of the treatment of the exception – are simply too dangerous to provide an adequate alternative to the problem of global order raised by Kaplan. Although this is not the place to explore this in depth, a more promising answer to the problem of order than the power political solutions offered by political realism is the cosmopolitan school of conflict resolution that sees social justice as the foundation to any stable and peaceful political order. However, despite the promise of conflict resolution as an alternative to power politics, there are two important and related senses in which Schmitt's critique of Kaplan applies equally to the cosmopolitan school of conflict resolution. First, with its embrace of universal human rights and its emphasis on the dignity of the individual, the politics of the cosmopolitan school of conflict resolution identifies its interests with the interests of humankind. As a result, there is an inherent risk in this form of conflict resolution that the "other" of the cosmopolitan school of conflict resolution, the political enemy, will be defined as the enemy of humanity. Second, in the post-Cold War era, many members of the cosmopolitan school of conflict resolution have embraced the doctrine of the just intervention which has led to a situation in which the territorial sovereignty of nation-states that fail to protect their citizens from human rights abuses has been significantly diminished. Given these two aspects of cosmopolitan conflict resolution – its politicization of the concept of humanity and its willingness to redraw and perhaps eventually erase the existing internal differentiation of sovereign territorial space – the field needs to be cognizant of the fact that its pursuit of justice for all carries many of the same risks that Schmitt sees in Kaplan's pursuit of a unipolar global order. Both cosmopolitan conflict resolution and Kaplan's political realism share a vision of the political world as a political universe rather than a pluriverse and in doing so they both risk that their political enemies, the "Other" to their respective visions of unity, will act out in unpredictable and violent ways. In this regard, Schmitt's political pluralism serves as a critical reminder that politics is by its nature an exclusionary practice. Every political order, even a global political order predicated on universal concepts of justice, presupposes the concrete existence of an excluded Other. Whether one pursues a secure global order through a realist lens such as Kaplan's or the lens of conflict resolution, Schmitt's concept of the just and equal enemy provides an ethical orientation to the constitutive outside of any political order that can help to limit, but not erase, the potentially destabilizing effects of that exclusion.

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Notes:

[i] Notwithstanding the plural forms political realism has taken over the last century, all forms share a belief that in any historical era the normative order of international politics is invariably constrained by the extent to which the powerful actors in the system are willing to forcefully respond to actors that threaten to destabilize the system. That is to say, contrary to the liberal tradition of International Relations, Kaplan and the realists understand order as an effect of force rather than reason.

[ii] For an excellent introduction to Schmitt's concept of the exception see Agamben, G. (2005) *State of Exception*. Chicago; Chicago University Press.

[iii] While Schmitt dates the end of the golden age of international relations with the dissolution of the JPE in 1914, he argues in the *Nomos* that the real beginning of the end of the Westphalian system occurred in 1823 when the United States announced the Monroe Doctrine. For Schmitt, this marked the emergence of a new political entity to replace the nation-state, a regional or hemispheric power that usurped the political power of the traditional nation-state. He referred to this entity as a *Großraum* and although he feared that the United States was well on its way to emerging from the Cold War unchallenged as a global hegemon (both ideologically and militarily), he did believe that it was possible, though unlikely, that a multipolar constellation of several *Großräume* might emerge to stabilize the global security system in the wake of the Cold War. See Luoma-aho (2007) for an excellent discussion of the *Großraum* and grosspolitics.

[iv] “As long as a state exists, there will thus always be in the world more than just one state” (1976, 53)

[v] See Chantal Mouffe (2005) for an excellent discussion of this very point.

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Lacanflct

By Jay Filipi

Abstract: This article explores Jacques Lacan's four discourses (Master, University, Hysteric and Analyst) and places them in the context of conflict resolution. This article begins a discussion of what Lacanian thought can do to help the analysis and practice of conflict resolution. Furthermore, there are certain existential problems within the field that are raised by the Lacanian perspective in Conflict Resolution.

Keywords: *Lacan, Conflict Resolution, Analysis, Critical Theory, Conflict, Burton*

Conflict¹ appears to be a basic component of human interaction²: “conflict is a generic phenomenon that knows no system boundaries.”³ Furthermore, as Maire Dugan's “nested model of conflict”⁴ illustrates, conflict is not only beyond boundaries, but transcendent of boundaries; conflict is therefore a product of human interaction with others and the systems that these interactions create. In order for conflicts to exist, there must be a self/other distinction; this would then mean that there could be no internal ‘conflict.’ However, internal conflict is well known, which means that: there is a problem with an inconsistent definition: It may be that the way in which ‘conflict’ is used when talking about the internal is inconsistent with how ‘conflict’ is used when discussing the external; or, the definition itself is flawed—it is the same phenomenon described, only the definition is incorrectly accurate; or, the self is not the most basic aspect of the person—the self is an other through which engagement in the world is acted out. Each of these solutions to the problem of conflict as generic and transcendental phenomena have their own issues, however, the one that answers best with the least amount of external complications is the third: the self as an other. This distinction of the self as an other, is a realization made by Jacques Lacan; the explanation as how this happens, and the implications for conflict are what follows.

Jacques Lacan's observations of children aged 6-18 months informed him, as well as others before him, that at some point a child becomes able to recognize the self in a mirror, or that the self is different from all else: the self exists where everything else ceases to be:

For the total form of his body, by which the subject anticipates the maturation of his power in a mirage, is given to him only as a gestalt, that is, in an exteriority in which, to be sure, this form is more constitutive than constituted.... this gestalt, whose power [prégnance] should be considered linked to the species... symbolises the I's mental permanence, at

the same time as it prefigures its alienating destination.⁵

Thus, the mirror stage functions to “establish a relationship between an organism and its reality,” to mediate “between the Innenwelt and the Umwelt.”⁶⁷ Beyond basic recognition of the self as distinct from the world, and is thus the genesis of the individual, it positions the I as an other (and necessarily in the imaginary world)⁸: the self as reflected in the mirror, is not the true self, it is a symbol⁹ for the self—a vehicle through which the true self interacts with the world at once alien and familiar; a border zone. As a Freudian, Lacan sees the ego (self) as an object: “an artificial projection of the subjective unity modelled on the visual images of objects and others that the individual confronts in the world.”¹⁰ Furthermore, Lacan (as Freud before him) thought that it is the identification with the ego that underlies aggression in humans. Therefore, as the self is an object formed and created through interaction in the world, intrapersonal conflicts are merely attempts at reconciling the ‘true self’ with the ‘self object!’¹¹ Furthermore, through Lacan, the principle definition of conflict, which Burton used, still holds in the intrapersonal context as well as any other context.

It is from the mirror stage that the self develops;¹² and early in development is desire. For Lacan, desire is the desire of the other,¹³ and that human beings must learn how to desire, or “It is only through fantasy that the subject is constituted as desiring: through fantasy, we learn how to desire.”¹⁴ This theory does not wholly deny Burtonian basic human needs, rather it adds to it by explaining how cultural inconsistencies arise through the navigation of structure and the communities of others: how false needs may become imperative desires that appear as needs within the culture.¹⁵ However, for Lacan, it is not merely satisfaction of basic needs that are important, but how those needs become mediated by social exchanges and translate into desire. “Lacan articulates this decentring of desire” by asserting biological needs “become inseparable from, and importantly subordinated to, the vicissitudes of its demand for the recognition and love of other people.”¹⁶ Furthermore, for Lacan, desires are created by discourse and expressed through language; therefore, every desire needs a symbol. A Therefore, at the same moment that the child is introduced to the realm of the imaginary (where the self is also other), s/he is also introduced to the symbolic world:¹⁷ the ‘self other’ becomes symbolic of the ‘true self;’ and an object of desire. “The price that is paid for the Symbolisation is thus the loss of the primordial object, the object a, the object of desire. What remains is an emptiness, a trace, something reminding of a fullness.”¹⁸

Through the radical creation of the symbolic and imaginary, there is created a distinction between self (which is really imaginary and other) and the other (which is symbolic and not self). For this distinction Lacan uses objet a for the ‘self other,’ and A, for the ‘other other.’ Objet a exists entirely in the imaginary order as a projection of the Ego.¹⁹ Whereas A, is the radical alterity, which exists in the symbolic order, as each A has its own uniqueness transcendent of the imaginary order that may not be assimilated.²⁰ It is through the discourse between objet a and A, that conflicts arise.²¹

Conflicts are created in the process of symbolisation; the creation of symbols (or language itself) is the method in which we attempt to create order; as such, order is not inherent, but imposed. This means that symbols (language and cultural artefacts) are forever cut off from nature.²² Furthermore, we attempt to create order as we

attempt to regain the object that was forever lost when the symbolic and imaginary were created: the Real. The real is that which is presocial and prelinguistic; it cannot be described (at least with any accuracy) in language. For Lacan, the real does not represent reality, it represents wholeness that is lost in the creation of self and through development of knowledge.²³ “In sum, we can say that the Real is that which comes before Symbolisation, and which provokes desire. When it is approached too closely, it is a horrifying reality, but it also makes Symbolisation possible.”²⁴ Desire, just as conflict, can manifest itself in awesome horrifyingly destructive ways, as well as sublime beautifully creative ways.

Lacan speculated that the world operated through the process of symbolization: the Real becoming the Imaginary Order producing the Symbolic Order that creates the Real. As society operates, so too the subconscious.²⁵ It is reasonable to assume that the subconscious and the outer social world are not operating in complete ignorance of each other; that these two processes of symbolization are both informed and informing one another, akin to Giddens’s ‘double hermeneutic.’²⁶ Conflict then occurs between individuals and structures when the processes by which meaning/order is created do not mesh. Lacan called the processes of how meaning/order is created discourse, of which there were four types: the University; the Master; the Hysteric; the Analyst.²⁷ Where Lacan’s analysis focused primarily on the intrapersonal conflict that manifests as personality traits, disorders, etc., etc., the rest of this essay applies the internal discourses to social scenarios and groups as a method of analysis and explanation of conflict and conflict generating systems.

Lacan illustrated the discourses through an algebraic formula with four symbols: S_1 the transcendental signifier, or “the principle that controls signification and significance”—it is the power/structure that decides true (productive) and false (unproductive)²⁸; S_2 the chain signifiers—these are the speech acts, cultural norms, rituals and discourses of society²⁹; \$, the divided subject, represents the subject forever removed from the real, it is powerless and caught between S_1 and a ³⁰; a , the object of desire—this is the substitute desire for that which was lost when the imaginary and symbolic order were created.³¹ Each symbol relates directly to two other symbols (the one directly across on the same plane, as well as the one either above or below) but influences all symbols in the system. Each Lacanian discourse is different; therefore each discourse can explain something different about conflict, and perhaps its resolution.

The first discourse, the discourse of the Master, is understood as the “tyranny of the all knowing and exclusion of fantasy.”³² In this discourse, the power/structure that decides what is true (S_1) is given primacy, and the divided self (\$) retreats beneath this power/structure. The purpose of this discourse is in production (reproduction) of Culture, knowledge and society (S_2) against the objet a , the unknowable object of desire (the ultimate reality).

1. *The Discourse of the Master*

$$\begin{array}{cc} S_1 & \rightarrow & S_2 \\ \$ & & a \end{array}$$

The Master discourse expects reproduction of his/her mastery and interaction

with the world of the Master discourse is domineering and inherently violent to those not in the seat of power. Furthermore, this discourse, by supplanting the objet a, expects that the reproduction of certain commodities is the ultimate goal; therefore what creates ‘the good.’ Reproduction of the power/structure is what matters most, and not whether or not this is a joyful or painful process.

The retreat of the divided subject, means that this discourse is devoid of fantasy—bereft of fantasy, there can be no disagreement, as if it does not fit the reproduction of power/structure, then it is wrong: this is a world of stark black and white. Furthermore, there is no need for disagreement as the master has arrived to truth, and thus becomes a champion of the ‘truth,’ whether that ‘truth’ is progressive or conservative. The master discourse excels at producing ideology and other commodities, however, through the subjugation of the divided self and the objet a, surplus jouissance³³ is created. As jouissance builds up, pleasure decreases; in order for enjoyment to be, it must be used, otherwise it creates pain. This discourse as a social force may be exemplified in its extreme as fascism, capitalist production, and Stalinist purges; more benignly this discourse appears in agents of schools, workforces and the law that force uncritical reproduction of power/structure. The Master discourse creates violence any place where there is power asymmetry; therefore, to reduce violence, society should either attempt to change (or at least limit) this discourse in places of power, or seek to balance power (thus reducing the violence generated).

The discourse of the University places primacy in the culture, ritual, discourse and meaning making practices (S_2) and the power/structure (S_1) retreats below. The aim of this discourse is to produce “knowledge as the ultimate object of desire (a), over and against”³⁴ the divided self ($\$$). This is the discursive realm of empowerment and learning techniques for the production of knowledge: Critical Theory, close reading, historical context. This discourse strives for competency and accountability to the larger context of society (academic discipline, state, or world).

2. *The Discourse of the University*

S2 -> a
S1 \$

The discourse of the university is utilitarian and based on researched findings advanced through generation of knowledge. This discourse is intrinsically creative as it is based on the search for ‘truth,’ instead of premised on a ‘truth’ already found. As the discourse of the University is responsible to the collective of humanity, there is nothing too large or too small to concern itself with.³⁵ This responsibility and quest for truth demands a certain reflexivity of the discourse. While this discourse seeks to improve society through the production of knowledge, it has the potential for the creation of violence. The violence of this system is the violence of utopia (guilt and disenchantment) as well as disciplinary³⁶ violence.

While no external pressures of conformity and reproduction exist and the agent is free to exercise creativity, there is not any needed: disciplinary forces exist which self police; being responsible to all means that mistakes are felt by all, therefore poor

knowledge production can have serious unforeseen side effects. This responsibility and the disciplinary pressure can lead to paralysis or perfectionism (and the violence of utopia). In this discourse, the objet a appears to be just beyond reach, and through production of knowledge, it appears to come incrementally closer. However, no matter how much closer to the objet a one tries to get, the objet a appears to still loom just out of reach. Combined with the responsibility to the collective, this lack of ability attain the objet a, at sometimes great personal cost, can lead to feelings of guilt, or cynicism: why couldn't I achieve? Is it even possible, why try? In order to mitigate the violence of this discourse as it tends toward destruction (self destruction), it becomes necessary to prop up the divided self—it is the complete subjugation of that self which designs the violence of this discourse!

The Hysteric's discourse however, is one that places primacy of the divided self (\$) over ultimate desire (a); this discourse produces power/structure that dominates the meaning making systems. The discourse of the hysteric is “‘unrealistic’, paranoid, delusional, hypochondriac, unstable and fluxatious, troublesome. Hysteria violates textual and disciplinary codes, rules, conventions, modes of production, technologies of knowledge, discursive bounds or limits.”³⁷

3. *The Discourse of the Hysteric*

\$ -> S1
a S2

In the discourse of Hysteria, the symptom takes the place of real production: spurious claims are perceived as realities, and the ego's drive to make 'worthwhile' contribution forces the hysteric to push their agenda upon the power/structure that subordinates the meaning making systems. The hysteric challenges subjectivity through misdirection, or atypical responses that have “the effect of alienating us from the certainties of knowledge and identity that we tend to buy into as we go about our daily business.”³⁸ In this discourse, desire takes on the role of threatening the “construct of subjectivity”³⁹ and belongs to the divided subject that has failed under a meaning making system: the hysteric may be therefore understood as a sort of heretic. Furthermore, it the rules of the meaning making system that are part of the problem, and therefore must be destroyed. The hysteric was created through violence that caused him/her to fail; therefore, the hysteric enacts violence as a means of legitimating the self against the violence perpetrated. The hysteric may be seen in the violent anarchy of Batman's the Joker, or in the conspiracy oriented Glenn Beck. Furthermore, while the discourse of the hysteric is an individualistic discourse, it may be the agent driving force behind a Master discourse.⁴⁰ Therefore, hysterics should be dealt with (in order to understand the violence done to them)⁴¹ in order to turn the discourse (and heal the violence), prior to him/her potentially taking control of a Master discourse.

For Lacan, it is at the moment of the Hysteric's question that the Analyst discourse must be the reply. The Analyst has the responsibility to listen to the hysteric, and help to mediate whether the hysteric is legitimate in decrying symptoms or not. The

Analyst discourse places the objet a (the object of desire) as prime over the meaning making systems (S_2). The product of the Analyst discourse is the divided subject over the power/structure.

4. *The Discourse of the Analyst*

a -> \$
S2 S1

The Analyst understands that the hysteric both loves and loathes the power/structure (S_1); and that his/her problem stems from an inability to make compromises. The Analyst operates a regime of listening without a pre-emptive or negating voice. The Discourse of the Analyst is ‘belated,’ it waits until it has heard the other discourses, and in the process, it modifies itself to hear better and create space for the other discourses. The Analyst discourse is the ethical realm concerned with intersubjectivity, alterity and the “politico-relational equality”⁴² The Analyst is the reverse of the Master’s discourse, and as such mediates the discourse of domination and oppression: The Analyst discourse is the discourse of conflict resolution, social justice and true emancipation. However, while the Analyst is the discourse able to turn the hysteric (healing the violence that has been done), the analyst is not without a violence generating aspect, it may also be co-opted by a Master or University discourse (thereby becoming those discourses in disguise)! Once co-opted by either the Master or University discourse, the Analyst discourse ceases to function as a healing, or violence reducing discourse, instead, it serves to neutralize, deradicalize and pacify opposition to the will of a particular agent or agency (power/structure).

The discourse of the Analyst is a necessarily independent discourse. Furthermore, for Lacan, this discourse must come after the discourse of the hysteric. If this is the discourse best suited for conflict resolution, as it is the ethical realm concerned with equality and alterity, what does that mean for the field? In the first instance, it suggests that conflict resolution must itself remain independent of the power/structure, i.e. not attaché to the state. Second, it suggests that true resolution and social justice can only happen after conflict. The second proposition is the more troubling one as it negates the potential for preconflict resolution; that necessarily, the hysteric must be pushed into action before work may begin. Furthermore, this is troublesome as for many in the field of conflict resolution, it is unacceptable to just wait for the next conflict to arise: after all, are we just supposed to sit around and wait for another Rwanda, another Holocaust? No. For two reasons, this is false: First, there is time between the discourse of Hysteria and genocide or directly violent attacks; second, we are living in conflict,⁴³ the first hysterics spoke long ago and their discourses continue to have effect in this world—if we as conflict resolutionaries wish to prevent conflict, then we must listen to the ancient Hysterics and respond through the discourse of the Analyst:

a -> \$
S2 S1

Five Practical Steps for Conflict Resolutionaries

1. Be mindful of the Master's discourse and how much control you give it

This does not mean necessarily that good works are impossible within the state beurocracy, only that conflict resolution is impossible. Furthermore, it does not imply that you are unable to take government money to do your work, only that the state may not have any real control over what you do with those funds, *and* that the work you do with that money is necessarily tainted by influence from the Masters discourse.

2. Understand the role of the University discourse and what it can do for practice

The University discourse generates and explores for new knowledge. Therefore, practitioners should be reading from and contributing to the body of knowledge that the Academics pull from. Furthermore, Academics should be doubly mindful of what techniques actually work in the field (e.g. just because something is theoretically sound, does not mean it is practical or prudent). It is incredibly possible for the University and Analyst discourses to have productive and creative interplay.

3. Listen openly and intently to the Hysterics. Their voices may not be grounded in any familiar reality, but they may very well be pointing to real issues that give rise to conflict.

As discussed before, that Hysteric discourse when coupled with a Master's discourse can become incredibly destructive. However, the symptoms that the hysteric is raving about are grounded in a perception of the world; there was some act that generated that perception, and it is possible that there is something within that act that is caustic, though it will undoubtedly be not what the hysteric believes!

4 Primacy in the objet a over meaning making practices

The unattainable object of desire, objet a should be supported by meaning making practices. Ritual should not be hollow actions, there should be personal inspiration behind them. Art, music and personal faith are examples this practice, whereas the converse of this exists when religion is institutionalized and dogma is created, or when art and music become commodified.

5 Primacy of the Divided Self over Power/Structure

When art and music are created for the purpose of expressing the soul, and genuine emotions, or when individual faith leads a person to live compassion for humanity, then the divided self is in control over power/structure. Art and music are able to survive (as well as combat) totalitarianism; genuine personal faith are capable of inspiring people to stand in the face of power and speak truth regardless of the consequences. Power/Structure is not legitimate because it is powerful, but because the divided self submits to it.

These steps seems simple enough on paper, but the challenge is to live them. Remember your heroes. Be your heroes.

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Endnotes:

1 John W. Burton, "Conflict Resolution: The Human Dimension," *The International Journal of Peace Studies*, 3(1), 1998 http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol3_1/burton.htm (December 13, 2010) *In this article, Burton agrees with Morgenthau's distinction between dispute and conflict.*

2 *Please note: the author does not believe that conflict is inherently negative, but existing in both negative and positive aspects.*

3 John W. Burton, "Conflict Resolution as a Political Philosophy" *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application*. Ed. Dennis J. D. Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1993: p. 56

4 Maire Dugan, "A Nested Theory of Conflict," *Women in Leadership* 1, no.1, summer 1996 and John Paul Lederach *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*. Washington, D.C. U.S. Institute of Peace Press. 1997, pp. 55-57

5 Jacques Lacan, "Ecrits: The First Complete Edition in English," edited by Bruce Fink, 95.

6 *Innenvelt and umvelt essentially mean inner world (psyche) and outerworld (environment).*

7 Ibid.

8 Slavoj Zizek, "An Introduction to the Ideas of Jacques Lacan," lacan.com (December 13, 2010)

9 *Lacan later refines this concept to mean not just a visual image, but any symbolic aspect that the true self identifies with.*

10 Admin. "What Does Lacan Say about the Mirror Stage – Part I," <http://www.lacanonline.com/index/2010/09/what-does-lacan-say-about-the-mirror-stage-part-i/> (December 13, 2010)

11 *It may be reasonable to assert that it is the inability to ever know (though the desire exists) our true self that is the cause of much of our intrapersonal crises.*

12 *The self is not a presocial being, but is created through socialization once development has reached a certain stage.*

13 Jacques Lacan, "The Other Side of Psychoanalysis," *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book XVII*, Norton, (2007) 38; 61.

14 Slavoj Zizek, "Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan through Popular Culture," *October Books*, (1992) 6.

15 *Burtonian human needs theory essentially stated that there exists a set of predisursive and universal human needs which are the root of all conflicts. Therefore, conflict arises from the lack of satisfaction of basic human needs, and were basic human needs satisfied there would cease to be conflict.*

16 Matthew Sharpe, "Jacques Lacan (1901-1981)" *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, <http://www.iep.utm.edu/lacweb/> (December 13, 2010)

17 Slavoj Zizek, "An Introduction to the Ideas of Jacques Lacan," lacan.com (December 13, 2010)

18 Slavoj Zizek, "An Introduction to the Ideas of Jacques Lacan," lacan.com (December 13, 2010)

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 *Lacan Rearticulates the Oedipus complex, as well as the symbol of the phallus to describe a primary intrapersonal conflict in childhood development. This conflict, while intrapersonal, develops from interaction on the symbolic order with A; furthermore it illustrates the method in which intrapersonal conflict may manifest external to the self, thus reinforcing Maire Dugan's model.*

22 Ibid.

23 *The real can be expressed further through a story in the Torah: The Expulsion From the Garden of Eden. In eating of the fruit from the tree of knowledge, Adam and Woman are plunged into the world of imaginary and symbolic (where they discover desire); forever removed from the Real.*

24 Slavoj Zizek, "An Introduction to the Ideas of Jacques Lacan," lacan.com (December 13, 2010)

25 Ibid.

26 Anthony Giddens "Hermeneutics and Social Theory," *Hermeneutics: Questions and Prospects* (Gary Shapiro, Alan Sica, ed), Univ of Massachusetts Press, 1989: 221

27 Jacques Lacan, "The Other Side of Psychoanalysis," *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book XVII*, Norton, (2007) 43.

28 Christopher Robert McMahon, "Hysterical Academies: Lacan's Theory of the Four Discourses," *The International Journal: Language, Culture, and Society*, 2 (1997) <http://www.educ.utas.edu.au/users/tle/JOURNAL/Articles/McMahon/McMahon.html> (December 13, 2010)

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.

33 *Jouissance is the pleasure that exists beyond the limits of pleasure. Pleasure must be used as it is created, otherwise there is an excess that creates jouissance. Similar to electronic circuitry, pleasure may be overloaded.*

34 Christopher Robert McMahon, "Hysterical Academies: Lacan's Theory of the Four Discourses," *The International Journal: Language, Culture, and Society*, 2 (1997) <http://www.educ.utas.edu.au/users/tle/JOURNAL/Articles/McMahon/McMahon.html> (December 13, 2010)

35 Ibid.

36 Michel Foucault, "Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison," Vintage, 1995

37 Christopher Robert McMahon, "Hysterical Academies: Lacan's Theory of the Four Discourses," *The International Journal: Language, Culture, and Society*, 2 (1997) <http://www.educ.utas.edu.au/users/tle/JOURNAL/Articles/McMahon/McMahon.html> (December 13, 2010)

38 Christopher Robert McMahon, "Hysterical Academies: Lacan's Theory of the Four Discourses," *The International Journal: Language, Culture, and Society*, 2 (1997) <http://www.educ.utas.edu.au/users/tle/JOURNAL/Articles/McMahon/McMahon.html> (December 13, 2010)

39 Ibid.

40 *Nazi Germany may be understood as a Master discourse with a Hysteric at the helm. The Hysteric created the symptom that the Master discourse then reproduced. Please note: The author is not attempting to link Beck and Hitler, or make any claims that they are the same, or equally as dangerous.*

41 *The Hysteric's questions are not inherently destructive, or negative. The hysteric sometimes has the liberty to ask questions that get right to the root of the problem; the only issue arises in understanding when the hysteric is true, or not.*

42 Christopher Robert McMahon, "Hysterical Academies: Lacan's Theory of the Four Discourses," *The International Journal: Language, Culture, and Society*, 2 (1997) <http://www.educ.utas.edu.au/users/tle/JOURNAL/Articles/McMahon/McMahon.html> (December 13, 2010)

43 *Conflict is the prime move of consciousness: if we recall the mirror stage, then with the loss of wholeness (the Real), the self is thrust into conflict being of nature but forever more removed from nature experiencing the world in the symbolic and imaginary. We are Adam and Woman, living East of Eden perpetually wishing for a return that is impossible.*

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Global Ambitions: A Critical Reading of the Report on “Graduate Education and Professional Practice in International Peace and Conflict”

By **Michael D. English**

In August of 2010, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) released a special report titled “Graduate Education and Professional Practice in International Peace and Conflict.” The report details findings from a study conducted to measure the level of academic preparedness of graduate students and professionals looking to establish careers within the field of international conflict. The results of the study do not bode well for graduate students or their academic institutions. In fact, Carstarphen, Zelizer, Harris, and Smith (2010) state, “Graduate-level academic institutions are not adequately preparing students for careers in international peace and conflict management” (p. 1). And this is just the first sentence of the summary.

Carstarphen et al. (2010) indicate that the Alliance for Conflict Transformation (ACT) was commissioned in 2005 by USIP to conduct an assessment of the preparedness of graduate students for work international conflict. The authors write, the “goal of this study was to explore the match between academic program offerings and the needs of the organizations and agencies that hire individuals for international conflict work” (2010, p. 2). From its title, the report appears to position itself as an overarching examination of graduate education and professional practice. In reality, the thrust of the report is decidedly one-way, emphasizing the relationship of graduate programs as the producers of skilled labor for organizations working in international conflict. According to Carstarphen et al., roughly half of the employing organizations interviewed felt students were unprepared upon graduation to work in these settings and that there was substantial room for improvement in graduate education. In short, academic programs are not providing students with the skills and knowledge employing organizations deem necessary for employment post-graduation.

One could read the summary and conclude based on its findings that graduate education in international peace and conflict is in a state of poor affairs. After all, in skimming the first page, the authors are quite forceful in their argument that the needs of employer organizations are not being met by graduate education. However, within the body of the report, the question of graduate education and preparedness unveils itself as a far more complicated issue than initially portrayed. Carstarphen et al. (2010) indicate that while slightly more than 50% of employers feel that graduate students are unprepared, roughly 90% of students and faculty feel the opposite. Therefore, the proclamation that graduate programs are failing to sufficiently prepare students is contested ground between the perceptions of employers and the perceptions of students, alumni, and faculty. In positing their conclusion as a lack of appropriate practical knowledge and applied skills, Carstarphen et al. conclude that employer perceptions of graduates is a truthful measure of the current situation.

After a careful review of their report, I am unsure about the accuracy of their claims and am skeptical their recommendations will benefit students of international peace and conflict.

If we take the report at face value, we can read it as a condemnation of the priorities of graduate education for emphasizing theory over practice. In spite of this initial reading, the contradiction in perception between academic programs (faculty, students, and alumni) and employer organizations points to a severe disagreement over the meaning of preparedness. While the report positions itself as an authoritative voice demanding action on behalf employers, a close reading of the text casts doubts on the validity of its authority. Specifically, the methodological considerations used to conduct the research are weak and lacking in transparency for such a damning critique. In a field as diverse as international peace and conflict, taking the big tent approach of inclusion makes it all the more important that the object under study be clearly defined and at the very least, reasonably comparable. The porous borders of international conflict make this a Herculean task. When demarcating the field, it becomes essential to recognize the differences in mission and scope of the organizations and institutions involved. The surface level analysis provided by Carstarphen et al. (2010) of the relationship between employer needs and academic programs fails to take seriously differences in approaches and philosophies toward working in international conflict revealed by the report. Additionally, it begs us to ask why a more reflexive and inclusive approach was not taken before determining the needs of employer organizations as superior. In defining the task as one of matching academic programs with hiring organizations, the authors failed to engage in the critical task demanded by the field of constant self-reflection, a crucial step required for our continued growth and development.

What follows is an attempt to offer a critical reading of the report on “Graduate Education and Professional Practice in International Peace and Conflict.” I will begin by situating the project within the frame of critical inquiry demanded by contemporary conflict theory. Next, I will explore the methodological considerations used to conduct the study. Focusing on these considerations allows us to measure the weight of the claims being made. I will proceed by interrogating the results of the report and the authors’ conclusions as drawn from their data as it relates to the state of graduate education. Finally, I will present an alternate interpretation of the report based on the previous discoveries and as situated within the context of discourses on global capitalism.

Prelude to Dissection

The proper consequence of graduate education is a healthy skepticism for all information. This skepticism springs not from a negative desire, but out of a commitment to the concept that critical interrogation is necessary developing knowledge. A critical reading then demands a certain engagement with the text that moves beyond initial observations to ask more probing questions. In this case, what rapidly becomes apparent is the positioning of the report; it demands action while simultaneously revealing little of its origins. A primary consideration must be based on the strength of the authors claim for change. Who funded the report and why? Who are

the organizations demanding change and how is their demand being measured? It is apparent when we read through the report that we are unsure which employer organizations support changes and which organizations do not. Additionally, we must consider the impact of the desired changes on the subjects they are placed. Graduate students are referenced throughout as malleable objects in the hands of academic institutions. Is this an accurate representation? Is the transition from a focus on general conflict education to specialization a desired evolution in the development of the field of international conflict work? Dare we ask what graduate students think of the worth of such changes? While there are scores of supplementary questions that can and should be asked of the report, we should also not limit our speculation to just the field. We should consider how such transformations relate to trends in other academic programs and beyond. The demand for labor specialization is not unique to international conflict and if anything reflects the changing face of labor under global capitalism. The movement from industrial manpower to biopower (knowledge/service labor) is indicative of a larger shift in the relations of production in advanced capitalist societies (see Hardt and Negri, 2000; Harvey, 2004). Capital increasingly demands specialized forms of labor and the use of administrators to manage and negate occurrences of conflict. The emergence of an international peace and conflict economy with close ties to the advocates of the neoliberal world order (World Bank and IMF) requires us to approach all claims for efficiency and practical skill over critical thought with a healthy degree of skepticism.

A Question of Terms – Defining the Subject Under Study

It should be noted from the beginning that Carstarphen et al. set themselves up with an incredibly difficult task in trying to define, let alone determine, the boundaries of the field of international peace and conflict. The authors begin by acknowledging the collapse of boundaries between what are assumed as two initially distinct areas of work related to conflict: those who work in international conflicts and those who work on international conflicts. Those who work in conflicts are involved projects dealing with humanitarian aid, development, and governance. Those who work on conflict focus on prevention, mitigation, management and resolution (peace agreements, diplomacy, etc...). Carstarphen et al. (2010) claim the boundaries between these two areas are disappearing due to overlap in interests and practices. Those working in conflicts desire to bring conflict sensitivity to their work, while those working on conflicts are increasingly concerned with root causes such as poverty. There is no discussion as to the prior relationship between those who work in and those who work on, nor is any mention made of tensions caused by the blurring of lines between these related but disparate groups. However, as a result increased demand, the number of graduate programs designed to prepare people for work in and on international conflict has also increased. There are both programs focused solely on international conflict and programs in development, security studies, and the like that now offer an integrated course of study focused on international conflict.

Carstarphen et al. (2010) offer a broad view of employing organizations working in and on international conflict and types of academic programs offering graduate education focused on international conflict. The term (international conflict), however, is itself left undefined. The absence of a specific definition of the phenom-

enon indicates a nebulous global scope for the possible circumstances and types of activities employing organizations might find themselves involved in. Under this banner falls a range of possible international conflict opportunities including, working on post-conflict stabilization and democracy building in Iraq, gender mainstreaming in the DRC, involvement with the UN peacekeeping mission in Cyprus, supporting indigenous rights in Colombia, or as part of a provisional reconstruction team in Afghanistan. All of these activities would be considered under the heading of work in or on international conflict and demonstrate the range of locations, conflict types (no war, civil war, interstate war), and possible organizations doing the work (individuals to IGOs to NGOs) based both internationally and in the United States.

The range in academic programs offering international conflict training and education is also quite broad. It is certainly not limited to the United States, but a global enterprise. There are significant qualitative distinctions between academic programs focused on conflict resolution, peace education, security studies, development and human rights; these distinctions are by no means fluid. Within the specific realm of peace and conflict studies, the distinction in terms used highlights different philosophies toward the study of conflict, be it peace studies (Galtung), conflict resolution (Burton), or conflict management (USIP). Differences in theory can lead to profound differences in the implementation of practice. Carstarphen et al. acknowledge this spread of diversity within academic programs and employing organizations, yet fail to provide more than a cursory explanation of how this diversity influences perceptions within their study.

The Study

Sixty interviews were conducted in total with faculty (25), students (14), and employers (21) who comprised the broadly defined field of international conflict in 2005. The sampling process for participants is not discussed in any detail. Sixty-one students and alumni were surveyed during this time, but only 14 were contacted for a follow-up interview. We are unsure how the 14 were selected. There is no mention of how the interviews were structured, the type of questions asked, or how the data were analyzed. Thirteen academic programs are represented from nine postgraduate institutions; the authors consider all as primarily focused on international conflict. The program names and institutions are unlisted. Twenty possible employing organizations are represented, including: “U.S. government agencies, intergovernmental agencies, and U.S.-based nonprofit and for-profit entities in the fields of conflict resolution, humanitarian operations, development, and consulting that work worldwide” (Carstarphen et al., 2010, p. 12). By this description, I am assuming that all employers and academic programs are based in the United States with no foreign-based organizations represented in the study. It is also unclear as to whether this study was comprehensive of academic programs and organizations scattered throughout the United States or whether the study concentrated on those strictly located within the Washington, DC area.

At its most specific, the report is centered on the perceptions of an undefined selection of primarily U.S. based employing organizations generally concentrated on “humanitarian and operational work” (Carstarphen et al., 2010, p. 3). It is unclear as to the scope of activities covered by these organizations and at what level they oper-

ate within conflict zones. Furthermore, there is no quantifying information about the type (U.S. government agency, NGO, IGO, etc...) or sector (development, peacebuilding, rule of law, etc...) represented by employing organizations. We are also unable to determine by the information provided if the category graduate students (both included in the study as participants and reflected as the objects of the study) is indicative of U.S. and/or foreign students, or for that matter whether the students in question attended U.S. and/or foreign academic institutions. This lack of specificity and clarity is problematic given the hundreds of organizations and thousands of individuals doing international conflict work throughout the world.

As consequence, we must be skeptical of the one piece of statistical data given by Carstarphen et al. (2010) to justify their introductory statement that graduate students are inadequately prepared to work in international conflict. In total, this study is based on contact with 107 individuals. Eighty-six of those people were students, alumni or faculty, and their voices are largely absent from the summary results presented on the first page. This leaves 21 professionals as the foundation from which the report draws its conclusion. Of these 21 professionals from 20 organizations, we are presented with Figure 1 indicating a dissatisfaction rate of just over 50% (Carstarphen et al., 2010, p. 7). Of the 21 individuals interviewed, 11 from what are the hundreds of organizations operating in conflict zones throughout the world, considered graduate education in international conflict to need substantial improvement. The problem with using such an assertive statistic as conclusive evidence and starting a publication with such a bold proclamation about inadequacy in a field as diverse as Carstarphen et al. claim it to be, is that the voices of 11 let alone 21 people hardly carry much statistical significance given a possible population of thousands. Can one person evaluate the conflict preparedness of individuals working with USAID, USIP, or any of the large NGOs on their vastly different projects throughout the world? Without more detailed information we are unable to determine if the recommendations that follow come from a spread of NGOs and governmental organizations or if they are only representative of 11 dissatisfied voices in the same sector. As a result of what appears as the U.S.-centric focus of the report, it is silent in terms of providing the opinions of strictly international organizations and more importantly, any input from the communities these graduates actually worked in (Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, etc...). The conspicuous absence of specifics and the limitation in scope of the research does provide a solid foundation from which to launch such an unflattering critique of graduate education. While these considerations are extremely important for accessing the power behind the authors' critique, it should not stop us from taking into account the conclusions and recommendations they put forth.

The Findings

The methodological limitations of the study cast doubt about the accuracy of the overall project, but we should not dismiss the findings outright. Indeed, most would agree that finding ways to improve graduate education is a worthwhile pursuit. What we need then is to consider the results and recommendations within the context of U.S. based international conflict programs and employer organizations, and what effect changes in graduate education might have on the overall field.

Carstarphen et al. (2010) produce a chart comparing the top five KSAs (knowledge, skills, and abilities) valued by academic programs and employers (p. 4). It is of little surprise that academic programs value theories of conflict analysis and resolution among the top two. These are followed by regional and political knowledge, concluding with applied skills. On the flip side, employers value field work or internships abroad in the top slot, followed by program management skills, country specific multi-cultural or language skills, conflict analysis and resolution knowledge, and closing out with sector-specific, practical and/or technical expertise. These two lists share some items in common, but are radically different in their arrangement of priorities.

Drawing from this list, Carstarphen et al. (2010) explain how the structure of academic programs hampers students from obtaining more specialized, applied skills desired by employers. Course progression moves from basic to specialized, but elective options are generally the only chance for students to become a subject experts. Specialization with applied skills is not a core component of most programs, with emphasis being placed on theory. Employer demands for specialists are based in part on the idea that these students will bring direct benefit to teams working in the field. The interviews indicate academic programs are producing generalists, which in turn, are considered of little value if the individual does not possess specific regional/political knowledge beyond the basic set.

The top KSA of employers is international experience. Why exactly international experience matters so much is not clearly explained, but we can infer that exposure to different cultures has some intrinsic value. Carstarphen et al. (2010) are sympathetic noting that it is difficult for students to gain this valued experience. Lack of resources and an absence of partner organizations make it far more likely that students who desire field experience will have to obtain it domestically. While there is little question that programs should encourage students to gain field experience, what tangible skills or knowledge this translates into for working in an international setting – in terms of benefits to both the student and the employer – is left undefined.

Conflict resolution work is increasingly becoming intermixed with development projects and the like. Stand alone conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts are frequently enveloped as part of larger projects focused on governance, economic growth, and rule of law. Encouraging conflict sensitivity within these diverse organizations and projects is replacing those organizations whose sole focus is on conflict resolution/peacebuilding work. Students therefore need to be advocates of conflict sensitivity and process, while possessing an equally deep knowledge of another area like international development, rule of law, etc... What is left unstated but implied is there should be a push within programs to offer dual degrees: conflict resolution + international law, conflict resolution + international development. Being a conflict specialist is just not enough.

Conclusions of the Report

The aforementioned results are undoubtedly interesting, but what exactly do they say? Carstarphen et al. (2010) articulate these different priorities of KSAs as a problematic gap between higher education and the field writ large. That there should be some disagreement as to which KSAs academic programs emphasize and those

emphasized by employers is not shocking. What is lamentable is the way the problem has been framed thus far. The blame, which by the way the research question is constructed can only land one place, is heaped firmly upon graduate programs. The solution proposed is to provide students with the training that matches the desired needs of employers: field experience; program management; specialists in a particular sector; cable of working cross-sector while mainstreaming conflict sensitivity; skilled networkers with ins to agencies like the World Bank and USAID; business minded; political savvy; and able to write clear, concise policy briefs and short reports. These are considered desirable skills for professional practice in international conflict work, of which, skills focused on conflict resolution and analysis are perceived of limited use to employers.

In contrast, Carstarphen et al. (2010) indicate a shared sense of frustration from students and faculty toward employer organizations. These concerns are expressed as a lack of understanding on behalf of employers as to what “programs actually teach and prepare students to do and of emerging best practices related to international conflict” (p. 8). Graduates expressed that organizations did not appreciate their skills and many organizations were stuck in old modes of conceptualizing conflict. Additionally, organizations admitted to not being adequately prepared to do international conflict work or knowing how to define what activities should be considered under that heading. It is of little wonder employers find themselves frustrated when they work with a conflict specialist that actually knows something about how conflict manifests itself in various settings throughout the world. Further, the demand that graduates mainstream conflict sensitivity within projects is not greeted with any sense of reciprocity; generalists who bring this sensitivity to their own organizations are not recognized of value. The wide and varied use of terminology within the field of international conflict also translates into a difficulty communicating the same idea in multiple languages across organizational cultures from the U.S. State Department to UNDP to NGOs operating on the ground (See Fast, 2002 for such a discussion on terminology). Finally, conflict specialists operating on the ground have little clout and/or influence over non-conflict trained leaders operating at the policy and decision-making levels.

Four explanations are offered for the gaps between academic programs and employers. First, there is a lack of consensus “as to the appropriate role of academic programs in relation to employers” (Carstarphen et al., p. 9). What is meant by the term appropriate is not explored. Employers want practical skills, but exactly how this universal skill set translates across both sectors and organizations is not discussed. Second, academic programs are constrained in what they can reasonably expect students to complete in terms of course work. The limited number of courses means a greater focus on theory/knowledge and less on skills. Third, students face a difficult situation getting field experience abroad. There is little funding and too few opportunities, especially when the work is unpaid and you are expected to support yourself. Finally, there is a lack of a well-defined, consistent field that comprises international conflict and peace work capable of encompassing all the different tracts under its broad heading. Our diversity means that each academic program and each organization within the field has a vastly different set of ideas and expectations as to the aims of international conflict work.

An Alternate Set of Conclusions

The problem we are left with is not the rather banal recommendations drawn by Carstarphen et al. (2010) for improving graduate education. One would be hard pressed not to agree that changes could be made within field of international conflict education and practice. Moreover, most graduate students and faculty believe there is room for improvement within the field and that there should be more communication between employers and academic programs. Everybody wants practice (a concept that is woefully undefined and under theorized within field), but there are still too few opportunities to engage in it. This is especially true if only international experience is validated. By positioning international experience as the top requirement, graduate programs are asked to fixate on problems on the Other (the site of conflict) and not on factors, like U.S. foreign policy, which may play a major role in generating current conditions on the ground. Exposure to the local population counts for very little when a drone strike can wipe out years of community development work. Subsequently, this demand for international exposure also does not take into consideration the ethical issues of creating conflict tourism type programs just to meet the demand for students to gain this crucial experience. Places like Cyprus, Northern Ireland and Kosovo suffer from visitor drop-in fatigue as it is already. We should be clear as to how visits from scores of neophyte conflict specialists will help assist or influence peacebuilding efforts in these communities.

Our current engagement questions the recommendations produced by the authors as decidedly in favor of a rather nebulously defined group of employer organizations. A critical lens is more than lacking. In stating that academic programs need to have an appropriate relationship with employers, we are to assume the needs of employers determine what is an appropriate role. According to the employer organizations interviewed, graduate education is not about developing critical thinking skills, but should instead reflect a trade school model aimed at producing docile labor with the temp skills of office workers and the specialized knowledge of a regional/area expert. However, if student and faculty perceptions of employer organizations more accurately reflect the truth about the state of international conflict – that employer organization do not understand factors underlying international conflict and are themselves increasingly becoming party to conflicts by their very positioning – does the problem lie with the graduate students whose education illuminates this quandary out of the hope of correcting it or with the organization operating from a distributive bargaining paradigm from the 1980s?

My intention here is not to shoot the messengers for offering us a critique of graduate education. Nonetheless, I believe this document presents a series of incorrect assumptions about the direction of the field and we should not be lulled into complacency given the potential weight the report carries with decision makers and funders of graduate education. Employers desire a certain type of conflict specialist suited for today's high turnover environment and skilled at such tasks as writing policy briefs. This is a reflection of trends within the dominant culture which demands ultimate flexibility among labor and the ability to process, synthesize and communicate as much information as possible to the greatest number of people in the shortest amount of time. In this environment, accuracy and complexity always

take a back seat to the purported facts, which are discerned free from historical context. There is a constant sense of urgency that demands action over contemplation, “Don’t think, DO!” This report compels us with such a call to action. From it we can speculate as to the consequences of demanding efficiency and technique over depth of thought and relationship building for the field. Those who only read the first page of this report, as many leaders and decision makers are prone to do, will conclude based on the summary that graduate education in international conflict is failing in its aim. Few readers will move past the first page. Even fewer readers will speculate about the sparse number or location of the employer organizations determining this evaluation. And even fewer will critically inquire as to why this report was published as a definitive assessment of graduate education and what the potential implications of such a report mean to the field of international conflict, whose future is being shaped and funded through a U.S. government think tank.

The complaint that academic programs spend too much time on theory is not limited to just to employers. Students and faculty also share the concern that students need real world practice. Yet, what constitutes practice, especially conflict sensitive practice, is highly dependent upon a theoretical understanding of conflict and conflict resolution. Without a solid foundation in theory how does one understand the change they are trying to make in the world or the problems that might arise from using one approach over another? Student comments that employers do not get the implications of theory or best practices should not come as a surprise. As one interviewee is quoted saying, “A lot of employers don’t know they need what we’re doing” (Carstarphen et al., 2010, p. 9). Perhaps employers understand all too well. Theory is dangerous! It has the power to alter perceptions and paradigms, and in some cases start revolutions. While the report proclaimed the need for conflict mainstreaming, which depends on the use of well-articulated peace and conflict theories, we should be hesitant to assert that we have reached a stage in our development where theoretical research is no longer a priority. Mainstreaming Western approaches should be considered with the utmost seriousness for both their potential benefit and potential harm. I will discuss this further in the final section, but I will state now that the ambiguous presentation of international peace and conflict begs the question, what does Western imply? We only need look at gender and development studies to see how quickly good ideas can be reinterpreted to enforce the status quo. Gender mainstreaming is certainly about more than getting white women to be the heads of corporations. There is no question that practice and research are essential in the construction of theory, but it is a fundamental mistake to privilege practice because it makes workflow and employee turnover easier to manage. The challenges of conflict and the pursuit of peace as liberation are messy and complicated activities. Theories cannot be ripped from books and applied directly to ever-changing situations; they must be constantly reinterpreted and retested as history unfolds to help us make sense of the present, the past, and the future.

I do not deny that a specialized knowledge is essential to working with groups in conflict, but that knowledge should be gained from working with the local population. Graduate schools cannot reasonably put students in the middle of dangerous conflicts. Why then should all the weight (and cost) of experience be placed on the shoulders of institutions and individuals, when it is the employer who is working (and profiting) in the particular area? Should employers not be expected to train and

invest in their employees by providing them with culturally and regionally specific knowledge one cannot get in the classroom? Students can obviously learn as much as possible about the places they desire to work, but unless they are promised employment before beginning their education how do they know what specific area they will be working in? Only few have the privilege to be both employed in an organization doing international conflict work and to study the conflict they are or will be working on. The vast majority of others come to graduate school and believe that conflict resolution and peacebuilding are priorities for dealing with international and domestic appearances of violence. They want to create new organizations and associations. Some of them may even want to stay within academia, especially those who believe education is the best way to combat violence and persistent poverty. Their theories tell them that when they go out to the field their work should reflect the desires and needs of the local populations. The relationship-centered work of John Paul Lederach (1995) and Marc Gopin (2009) present models for engagement considered hugely important by the field, yet wildly at odds with the employer skills described above, which are designed for dealing with elites and decision makers. We need to be more specific about what groups these changes in conflict training and education are focused at preparing students to work with. Is it local populations or is it state level decision makers? Is the training elicitive or prescriptive based in its approach? How bitter are the graduates trained as conflict specialists and peacebuilders that spend all of their time writing grant applications to only watch the funds disappear into the bowels of the organization? How defeated are local groups funded to do projects and are abandoned when a sexier conflict comes along?

While I more than desire to see changes made in graduate education, starting with academic programs does not alter contradictions at the core of the international peace and conflict economy. Conflict specialists, like the authors of this report, are right to emphasize the need for a greater discussion to take place. That is after all what we conflict specialists pride ourselves in promoting. However, the changes needed are not hierarchical flowing from employers to academic programs. What is needed is a more effective feedback loop from all the parties involved: graduate students, academic programs, employer organizations, and most importantly, communities on the receiving end. The success of graduates, their programs, and organizations working in international conflict should not be based on a single measure determined by employers, but a combined measure of all involved. If the graduates are failing, so are academic programs and employer organizations. Finally, the entirety of this project should be considered as embedded within the context of discourses on globalization and changing relations in production under global capitalism.

Global Ambitions

I will conclude this paper by speculating about the potential dangers of moving forward with such recommendations without keeping a critical eye to the future. There is little doubt that this report speaks volumes about the increasing demand for people with conflict engagement skills and knowledge to work in international conflict. One of the questions I raised at the beginning of this essay dealt with our need to address the unspoken consequences of the field's dramatic expansion. Carstarphen et al. (2010) write, "the need remains for both academic institutions and

employers from the West to identify how best to “export” Western-based conflict resolution theories and practice and make them culturally and contextually appropriate and to develop improved practice and models based on local practices” (p. 10). In prioritizing the exportation of “Western” based conflict resolution adapted to local sensitivities as a site where academic programs and employers can build common ground, the authors return us to the sphere of neoliberal ambition. As a result of their methodological considerations, when we read Western in this report we are forced to insert United States. The programs and organizations involved are not representative of a global movement to adopt a shared vision of conflict knowledge and practices. Instead, the failure of academic programs is based on the demands of primarily U.S. organizations and U.S. international conflict programs. This raises scores of important questions not touched by the report, due in part, to the limitations imposed by its authors. Carstarphen et al. leave themselves unable to critique the contradictions discovered in their own research. If there is such a lag between academic theory and organizations operating in the field, is pushing for the exportation of Western-based conflict practice going to alleviate the contradictions of a field so broadly defined? What if part of the problem within conflict zones is the international peace and conflict economy that springs up as a result with hundreds of NGOs competing for a limited pool of resources? The demands of the World Bank, far from bringing hope and prosperity, are themselves catalyst for conflict. We, as a field, must be more critical about how our knowledge and practices are being implemented on a global scale.

The spread of Western centered conflict resolution practices places us within what Hardt and Negri (2000) would describe as the imperial ambitions of global capital. The critique is not limited to the Left alone. Realists like Mearsheimer (2011) also see imperial folly writ large in the behavior of U.S. foreign policy over the last few decades. The movement within advanced industrial societies, particularly in the West, from industrial labor to biopower reflects a major shift in the relations of production. It does not negate old class antagonisms or transcend them, but instead reveals a new focus on capital’s and by extension neoliberalism’s fixation on managing human relations. We should be hyperaware of studies, such as this report, when the results originate from an organization funded by the United States at a time when the country was involved in two wars (Afghanistan and Iraq). The demand for conflict specialists of a specific sort in 2005 can be read as the desire to find new ways of trying to manage two failing military operations. The introduction of U.S. military’s counterinsurgency strategy and the expanded use of provisional reconstruction teams (PRTs) are profound examples of the incorporation of conflict resolution into U.S. foreign policy. Certainly, we can be both critical and supportive of such a shift in the U.S. policy. The ability to impose a human rights agenda as a global concept is after all much needed given how little value life was accorded during that last century. Yet in true dialectical fashion, this usurpation of national sovereignty under the weight of questionable, if not illegal military action should not be seen as a golden opportunity for conflict specialists. The lack of recognizable distance between invader, occupying force, development worker and conflict specialist casts doubt upon the entire conflict resolution project’s aim, especially when power is transferred into the hands of administrators and practitioners whose primary interest is the agenda of the market economy vis-à-vis the United States. Since class antagonisms remain unresolved under global capitalism, the distance between the ownership class and the

rest continues to grow. The demand for specific forms of development guided by the World Bank, including the privatization of common land and resources, exacerbates already tense conditions. Conflict resolution theories and practices are inserted into this volatile mix. The resultant silence found within the majority of the field to contest global capitalism's exploitive and conflict generating tendencies can be read as a trade-off for the ability to work in said areas. The implications of this trade-off are beyond the scope this inquiry, but the assertion that graduate students are not adequately prepared to work in the field might, in contrast, be the perceptiveness of said students to the contradictions inherent between the liberatory aspirations of conflict resolution and the neoliberal ambitions of certain organizations within the development and security sectors.

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Pablo Kickasso VS Salvador Darling and Question to Saint Augustine from Hippo

By Irakli Kakabadze

Pablo Kickasso VS Salvador Darling

One day under a postmodern sky,
Artists decided to create two organizations.

Pablo Kickasso was a radical organization

Designed
By radical artists
to

Destroy the system of domination
and
Exploitation..

and
Cultural
Relativism
and
Hunger
and
poverty
and zillion other problems.

Members of Pablo Kickasso
were
called for
by manifest destiny
to
Kick Ass
of
aristocracy
of
postmodern world.

They have
mildly disagreed
with Judith Butler

and have
strongly agreed
with
Zizek's
argument.

Class Struggle.
was
the slogan
of
Pablo Kickasso.

Newly found
secret
revolutionary confederation
of artists
who
were fighting for life
and
against property.

They had actions
to
destroy
the bourgeois
dominion.

To paint over
every manifestation
of
Petty Bourgeois
Consciousness..

Paint over,
and
Issue

Contemporary Fatvas
against
human divisions.

They have called it:
Visual manifestos!

There was another
Wonderful
and very charming
artists
organization.
Called:
Salvador Darling.

It was also looking
for
a better world.
But through charming
and
Cunnilingus.
Through
aesthetics of power
and shmoozing
with
top
representatives of high society.

Salvador Darling
was
such a darling
that
its members
did not believe
in violent
or nonviolent
revolution.
Instead they
believed
in
Conflict Resolution;

They were
Wonderful cunning linguists
Practicing
amazing

Cunnilingus.
In a multilingual
Multicultural
environment;

They did not
like
any conflict;
especially
any
social conflict;

They loved sex
and
sexual liberation
through arts.
And they loved power of
Negotiation;
They even thought
that
Compromise could work.

Salvador Darling
was
for Transforming
the world;
with slightly
Freudian dreams;
And it was such a darling
that
it has succeeded
number of times;

There was
a
constant struggle
between
Pablo Kickasso
and
Salvador Darling.

They were like
IRA and Liberal Democrats
in Northern Ireland;
or Fatah and Hamas;
In an artistic world;

There was a
DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM
in between
them.

Until one day
one guy,
woke up in the morning
decided
to make some coffee
for himself
and his partner.

And for a moment
he thought
that
This morning

He was both:
He had it both:
He agreed with both;
He wanted to work with both:
He wanted to paint both:

PABLO KICKASSO AND SALVADOR DAR-
LING!

He also thought:
Some people call this prostitution
or
Some people call it post-modernism.

Humans are
such
complicated
creatures.

What a complicated world
After
Demise of Berlin Wall.

The world
where
grafitti paintings
of

PABLO KICKASSO
and
SALVADOR DARLING
Coexist
in peace.

And more than that:
Both PABLO KICKASSO AND SALVADOR
DARLING
are
totally nummed
by
a narcotic
called
electronic media.

“This is my dialectics
of
Emancipation”
thought the guy
and sipped his coffee.

That morning
PABLO KICKASSO AND SALVADOR DAR-
LING
UNITED.

And the world
continued
to be
a
complicated place.

WE SHALL OVERCOME
Decided the guy
and
continued to sip
his
instant coffee.

Question to Saint Augustine from Hippo

Dear Saint Augustine, I am reading a report:

They say weather is getting colder
Trans-Atlantic flights maybe canceled,
Over next week,
And I am waiting for my kidney medicine.

Oh, how horrible that is, Saint Augustine
Waiting for your kidney medicine
To come from another country while
Not having a health insurance
that pays for it

And hearing a report;
There will be a storm.

Saint Augustine, I was just in Hippo
I just came out of it,
You won't believe how many times
I visited Hippo
Without sugar
Looking for some help
Without my conscious effort
Looking for bits of sugar
Or some sweet water
Or even some Coca Cola
But not sugarfree..

Saint Augustine,
You know it very well,
When you are in Hippo
You always need something
With sugar
To get your blood Glucose
up
and get out of your comatose
Situation;

And when someone offers
The Sugar
Or Juice
Or even Coca Cola
Manufactured in Atlanta, Georgia

Not Turkish, Russian, Persian
Armenian, Azerbaijani
Georgia,
But US-Georgia.
When someone offers and you
Take this sugar or Coke
Then you leave Hippo
and slowly start
Becoming Hipper!

It always feels very good,
Saint Augustine,
Coming out of Hippo
And going towards Hipper.
I'm sure you've felt this
Many times
When you have left Hippo
To go up,
and up,
To commanding heights
Of the Roman Empire!

Saint Augustine,
I am reading the report,
And report says
That
In 1996
Four thousand
Four hundred
Twenty people
in America
Could have created secrets.

Now their number is down
to
2,557.

Saint Augustine,
I must confess:
I am reading a report
From "Time" magazine.

Saint Augustine,
This report tells me:
That
US Army owns
75,080 secrets

State Department owns
55,224
Justice Department
48,950

And President
has
1,609
secrets exactly.
With no exaggeration.

Behind the report
I know
That other countries
Also keep secrets
Like some of them
Smile to each other
While they want to
Nuke each other.
All of those damn countries
All of those damn nation states
Keep those dark secrets
In their dark brains.
I guess dark rooms
Aren't fashionable anymore.
In the age of rationality
They practice dark brains;

Saint Augustine,
I want to ask you?
Why keeping
Those Secrets?

Do you know, Saint Augustine?

I'm asking you
Since you knew so many other things
Maybe you have an answer
On this one too.

Saint Augustine,
I've been in Hippo
Many times;

One time,
My glucose level dropped
To 17;

I cold not believe I was alive
Neither doctors
They were watching
In disbelief that
I was alive;
But somehow,
I didn't die in Hippo
And went up again
To being hipper;

I was in Hippo
More than 100 times
Last 22 years
And I have survived Hippo
More than 100 times;
I don't even remember
exactly
How many times;

I just wanted to connect
Once I heard you were in Hippo
many times
I guess;
Since everyone says
You are from
Hippo;

Saint Augustine,
I guess,
When you would come out of Hippo
You will always get hipper,
Since that is almost a given,
After Hippo Coma
Glucose is
Jumping to
Hipper.

So after being in Hippo
So many times
Through last
22 years.
I wanted to ask you:

**Why did you
think
That war is just?**



(Photo credits - L: by Dede Hatch, R: PEN World Voices Performance Cabaret photo by Jocelyn Valdes.)

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Art Damage - Reflections on Shepard Fairey's Murals in Cincinnati

By Michael D. English

We drove through Over-the-Rhine on a cold Sunday morning a few weeks back in December. If Cincinnati is empty during the business week, it looks like a ghost town on weekends. I wanted to see if any murals were left from Shepard Fairey's retrospective "Supply and Demand" at the Contemporary Art Center. Fairey installed a score of them as part of a huge street-meets-gallery-meets-endearing or not-so-endearing public showing in the city. The murals are dispersed throughout the metro and surrounding areas. Controversy waited eagerly for the exhibit and some pieces were painted over hours after they were put up for being...well... controversial and thought provoking. As art should be.

Though its reputation for conservatism precedes it, Cincinnati has always had a thriving and progressive (if at times elitist) art scene. Prosecutors did after all make a name for themselves contesting Mapplethorpe's work for being obscene and are well know for their near obsession with Larry Flynt's smut empire. Still, artists have always risen to the occasion and pushed back, both local and visiting. Watching David Yow strip down naked in protest and tribute during a set with the Jesus Lizard, only to be handcuffed and escorted off to jail was a defining moment of my youth. The city's street art and graffiti are surprisingly rich if one knows where to look. From an early age, I knew which side of the art-law divide I stood on; I vowed creativity over repression any day of the week.

I used to pretend art was the only way the city knew how to handle its rage and frustration from its ostensible lack of ability to progress beyond what seemed like a fifty-year lag behind the rest of the world. If any place understood what it was like to be Palahniuk's

"spiritually bankrupt middle children of history" it was Cincinnati. Violence is both entertainment and the everyday. Faith in the power of art as a form of resistance becomes a Rust Belt wide survival mechanism. The malevolence that haunts this place is always present. The faltering of the industrial economy hit long before the financial crisis. The move from structural to direct violence is only more visible because gentrification and unemployment have shifted the demographics now threatening the sanctity and whiteness of suburbs. Cincinnati's attempt to edge out Chicago in terms of homicides speaks volumes of a city with less than 350,000 people.

The poor have always taken a back seat to Paul Brown's losing football franchise and other fronts for ignoring the basic human needs of individuals and families in favor of the business community. The working class willingly adopted a scornful attitude of the inner city believing those residents responsi-

ble for their fate. Neighborhoods teeter on the verge of collapse, waiting for nature to reclaim what humanity tried so hard to make permanent. People still live among tenements built at the turn of the last century before the world declared war on itself two times over. Development in these areas only means expulsion for its residents. In return, the new waterfront stadiums glisten as they greet traffic along the interstate to the illusion of urban renewal and investment.

We find some of Fairey's pieces still running. Splendor among decay. I snap a few photos. We head toward Northside. I feel uneasy. While I enjoy the images, I can't help but feel like they are out of place. The lines are too clean, the colors too pure, and the messages too full of promise. That might have worked



once for a presidential campaign, but not for the years of frustration built up in this joint. What I looked at did not reflect the reality I knew from the years I spent wandering these streets trying to etch my own place into history. Fairey's murals did not tell the story of Cincinnati's cycles of violence, racial segregation, police shootings or race riots which threatened to destroy it. What right did an outsider have to try and beautify this bullshit pseudo-metropolis?

Aung San Suu Kyi stares back at me. She quietly observes traffic from a building a few blocks east of my old apartment on a wall I had adorned more than a few times in the past during my midnight strolls. I wondered how many people in Northside, let alone Cincy knew who she was. Would they care she was now free? Would they tell their children to look up to her like they did Ochocinco or T.O.? I doubted it. Why pretend to be a political prisoner when you're already an economic one? Where was the escapism in that proposition?

And yet, there she is. Aung San Suu Kyi. Internationally recognized as a symbol of resistance and a passionate advocate for democracy in the face of totalitarian repression. There is a mural dedicated to Aung San Suu Kyi and it resides in Northside installed by the same artist who designed the most recognizable image of the last two decades. An image of this country's first African-American president, an icon blazoned with a single word: hope. It is only after leaving again that I understand how badly Cincinnati needs the work Shepard Fairey on its walls, regardless of how played out the hipsters think his work has become. Someone needs to believe in the city and Fairey made that investment. If one kid googles Aung San Suu Kyi and learns about her struggle, Fairey's art has transcended its material plane. And that is what makes art worthwhile, because the seeds of change have to be blossom in the imagination. To paraphrase a line from from one of my favorite MCs, someone needs to teach the kids there's more to resistance than making a fist. What better example to set for our youth than transcending the limitations of concrete and their imagination with paint, paper, and paste?

Conflict engagement is about taking chances and trying to make positive social change through action. Art is one vehicle for such activities, but it's not without risk. Even with the best of intentions our efforts can be greeted with the paint rollers, scorn, and violent reprisal. Art can be both grounds for resistance and transcendence. Without such efforts, especially those of Fairey and the community of local artists and graffiti writers, there is only hopelessness and repetition of the same. Cincinnati thrives when it contests. Fairey's remnants are a reminder that we can step outside of the cycle and that sometimes it requires the vision of an outsider to let us experience

new possibilities.

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Disarming Manhood: A Narrative-Based Critique

By **Lane Eldridge Salter**

In *Disarming Manhood: Roots of Ethical Resistance*, David A.J. Richards theorizes on why some men are doomed to perpetuate patriarchy while others deviate into “democratic manhood”. A narrative analysis of Richards’ theory yields a narrative of masculinity so narrow it positions interventions into masculine violence nearly outside the reach of our field. But if considered loosely, Richards’ observations shed light on paths we can investigate.

Richards’ narrative of democratic manhood, induced from the biographies of five men: William Lloyd Garrison, Leo Tolstoy, Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King and Winston Churchill, depicts a boy who confronts two turning points on his path to patriarchal or democratic manhood, both hinging upon his relationship with his maternal caregiver.

The first turning point is the boy’s early separation from, or continued closeness with his maternal caregiver. If the boy remains close throughout his childhood, he witnesses hidden transcripts of female ethics (a la James Scott 1990) that subtly subvert the dominant patriarchal narrative. The boy is exposed to female thought and experience and draws from a broader repertoire of ideas when constructing his own ethical voice. He is free to opt out of the dominant patriarchal narrative, to choose nonviolence, and to remain true to his innate respect for women.

However, if the boy separates from his maternal caregiver, he’s left defenseless against the dominant patriarchal narrative that stakes a man’s honor on the chastity and fidelity of women in his charge, and requires honor be preserved through violence. Deprived of any alternative, he adopts this narrative, stifling his innate respect for women and squelching an authentic ethical voice that would call into question those structural inequalities, oppressive power structures and acts of violence legitimized by patriarchy.

If the boy comes through childhood with his maternal relationship and personal ethical voice intact, he faces a second turning point, hinging on the idealization of the maternal caregiver or the authentic acceptance of her sexualized voice. If the man idealizes his maternal caregiver as saintly and asexual (submitting to the virgin/whore binary), this spawns an inner struggle between his own sexual life and his reverence

for his mother’s sexual purity. Unable to comprehend an authentic female sexual voice, he is confused and troubled by his own sexuality and that of the women in his life. This confusion leads to celibacy or extreme infidelity, prohibiting functional, egalitarian relationships. But if the man builds an authentic relationship with his maternal caregiver, he accepts her female sexual voice, views women realistically, and forms egalitarian relationships with other women.

The man who has maintained an intimate relationship with his maternal caregiver, and learned to accept her authentic sexualized voice, has achieved “democratic manhood”, the normative pinnacle of Richards’ narrative.

This being a narrative analysis rather than an epistemological critique, I’ll set aside Richards’ dubious methodology and conclusions, and turn instead to the terrain of possibility constructed by the narrative: the paths opened and the dead-ends charted for the project of disentangling masculinity and violence. Richards’ narrative narrows our field of possible engagement dramatically by reducing the totality of masculine ethical development to a single causation, restricting the window for intervention to early childhood, limiting the pool of possible interveners to a single mother figure, and disqualifying men from steering boys’ ethics away from patriarchy.

I think it’s best we reject this narrative, lest we surrender the cultivation of a less violent masculinity solely to the power of early childhood maternal instinct. The project is broader than this, and calls for a broader narrative that opens more paths of engagement and invites all to engage.

But, if we loosen our grip on Richards’ narrative, stepping back to squint at it, a horizon emerges that is familiar and actionable for those in our field. His observations dovetail with my concept of “narrative agility”, which I believe any good peace education, and any good education at all, should aim to build. To me, narrative agility is the capacity to critically interrogate and sculpt one’s narrative landscape, to choose which narratives to oppose, adopt and disseminate, and to wield narrative power ethically and effectively.

Richards’ observations illuminate aspects of narrative agility. He observes that immersion in non-

dominant narrative elements is prerequisite to any deviation from a dominant narrative, especially the creation of a personal counter narrative. Richards reinforces the necessity to view others as authentic, particularized “concrete others” (Maarten Hajer 1995), not as generalized ideals, in order to understand ourselves and be in empathetic relationship with one another.

While I take *Disarming Manhood* with a grain of salt, I’m left reinvigorated, ready to facilitate educational experiences full of contradicting narratives, countervailing ideas, wide-ranging experiences and authentic individual voices, and to take this work seriously. After all, this is work for all of us, not only mothers and sons.

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Art and Liberation: A Review

By **Jay Filipi**

Contrary to previous attempts at understanding the Marcuse project, Douglas Kellner states in his opening essay to *Art and Liberation: The Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse, Volume 4*, that “aesthetics is not the key, primary, or central element in his [Marcuse’s] thought,” however, it is “an important part of Marcuse’s project” (p. 3). Furthermore, Kellner insists that in the thirty years after Marcuse’s death, most people have misinterpreted all, or at least part, of Marcuse’s work, attempting to ascribe value to, or criticise that which is non-existent. For example, Kellner takes issue with the first interpretation posited by Barry Katz (1982) and furthered by Timothy Lukes (1985) which understood Marcuse’s aesthetics as a transcendental ontology that would “cancel the totality of existence without being cancelled by it” (p. 2). Katz contests the idea put forth by Lukes, that Marcuse’s aesthetics leads to withdrawal from politics and an escape inward; and agrees more with Berthold Langerbein (1985) that Marcuse emphasizes and repeatedly attempts to mediate between art and politics in order to preserve a separate aesthetic dimension. However, Kellner asserts that Langerbein fails to address the other dimensions Marcuse mediates, such as philosophy and critical theory.

In regards to more recent scholarship, such as Charles Reitz (2000), where Reitz states that Marcuse’s work can be divided into two spheres “art-against-alienation” and “art-as-alienation.” Kellner largely agrees, and yet suggests, that splitting his work this way is what leads people to misinterpret Marcuse’s work as tending towards withdrawal, or aestheticising politics. “Marcuse’s project was to develop perspectives and practices of liberation that combined critical social theory, philosophy, radical politics, and reflections on art and cultural transformation” (p. 3). Readers need to be able to see the totality of the Marcuse Project as the various components sometimes “stood in tension with each other” (p. 3). E.g. art is both alienation and against it all at once. The remainder of Kellner’s opening essay walks the reader through a his interpretations of Marcuse’s chronologically presented essays that follow beginning with a segment of Marcuse’s dissertation written in 1922 and ending with a posthumously published interview (1984). Kellner’s

opening essay not only provides an interpretation of Marcuse’s essays within the book, as well as other major works (*Eros and Civilization*, *One-Dimensional Man*, *An Essay on Liberation*, and *The Aesthetic Dimension: Toward a Critique of Marxist Aesthetics*); but also provides useful historical and biographical information that sheds light onto the character of Herbert Marcuse.

The first piece by Marcuse is the introduction to his dissertation. In this piece Marcuse begins to grapple with art in a critical way, and the reader begins to see the seeds of what will be the Marcuse project. In this essay classic Marcusean aesthetic tensions emerge: liberation/alienation in art and artist; engagement for change by art in the world/escapism to idealised realms. There are also hints at concepts later developed by Lacan, in which art is an attempt to find that which is ultimately ‘real’ and will complete the soul. Marcuse also clearly shows his reverence for traditional artistic ‘high culture,’ a theme that remains (with notable deviance) throughout his writings on art.

In “The Affirmative Character of Culture” we are introduced to Marcuse the radical. Marcuse as anti-(materialism, capitalism, positivism, affirmative culture). Here, he appears to embrace the very notions of bohemia through a Hegelian mind-soul link, universal empathy, individuality and his characterization of transcendence and the ideal; where transcendence is the good, the beautiful and the true, the ideal is that “which in its very unreality keeps alive the best desires of men amidst a bad reality” (p. 92). Marcuse does not articulate utopia or illusions as a particularly bad thing, but dialectic in nature, asserting that while utopia may be an unattainable ideal, it is not bad to have this. Furthermore, it is the illusions portrayed in art, which make utopia real, even if never attainable.

The 1967 essay “Art in the One-Dimensional Society” outlines Marcuse’s core beliefs about art, revolution and politics, as well as offering a rare tip-of-the-hat to popular culture in the name of Bob Dylan (as “the only revolutionary language left today” (p. 113)). This essay illuminates Marcuse’s understanding that art is a human need and a way of experiencing reality. Marcuse states here that art can only be revolutionary when it refuses to “become part of any Estab-

ishment, including the revolutionary Establishment” (p. 115). Furthermore, art is essentially aesthetic; art may not be instrumentalized and maintain authenticity as art; art is perpetual revolution. This essay also suggests that authentic art is a method for combating one-dimensionality: that art is a technique, and that a technique is the opposite of technology (and by extension the technological rationality that plagues the one-dimensional world); technique is creative and liberatory, whereas technology destroys and oppresses.

These lines of thought are continued in “Society as a Work of Art” and “Art as a Form of Reality” Marcuse says that reality is a creation of art, plus imagination. One way in which it accomplishes this is through purification of society: “Art purifies, it removes what is and remains unreconciled, unjust and meaningless in life” (p. 126). Furthermore, “The utopian idea of an aesthetic reality must be defended even in the face of ridicule, which it must necessarily evoke today. For it may well indicate the qualitative difference between freedom and the prevailing order” (p. 128). However, art is unable to be harnessed for change: art to be allowed to be art, in order for the liberation and transformation of society to continue. In “Art as a Form of Reality,” Marcuse adds that art can never become reality without cancelling itself out; and the so-called ‘living art’ is, in reality, a new society and this aesthetic vision is part of the revolution. Art is inherently ‘other,’ and it is through human development and liberation that art may be truly enjoyed.

In “Art and Revolution,” Marcuse illuminates the contradictions in art as a weapon of class-consciousness. “Art can indeed become a weapon in the class struggle by promoting changes in the prevailing consciousness.” However, it cannot be created as a weapon, furthermore, by virtue of being subversive, art is revolutionary and thereby associated with revolutionary consciousness. Part of the problem with designing art to combat class, is that it cannot, due to aesthetics, reflect the true reality of what is going on and still be art.

“Lyric Poetry After Auschwitz” is an unfinished manuscript in which Marcuse struggles with the question of whether lyric poetry is possible after the world has born witness to the extreme depravity and horrors of humanity and technology, as presented in the symbol of Auschwitz. Through this struggle, the question is not fully answered, however, it is clear that Marcuse believes art is still possible, and furthermore, it is necessary.

The final pieces in the book are interviews with Marcuse about his life’s work. In these concluding pieces, we get a glimpse of Marcuse’s reflection on nearly 60 years of work in critical aesthetics regarding: the essential ‘otherness’ of art and how it is both more and less real; whether there is revolutionary quality of

rock and roll; and, the relationship between politics, art, revolution, beauty, and any potential utility.

My major critique of Marcuse is his failure to do much in the way of modern musical and artforms, such as rock and roll, aside from large-scale dismissal of the potential liberatory and radical potentials. What remains necessary is an explanation as to why, for example, Bob Dylan is a legitimate and revolutionary artist/language of revolution, but all the other contemporaries of Bob Dylan are basically inherently self-defeating? Why is Bob Dylan authentic, as opposed to everyone else doing the same thing?

Kellner’s approach to Marcuse is historical, which provides brilliant critical insight into the development of Marcuse’s thought as it continues to be refined and attempts handle the creative contradictions of the aesthetic world. Unfortunately, Kellner’s opening essay provides the reader with Kellner’s interpretation of Marcuse, before the reader has a chance to interpret Marcuse. While the historical and biographical background was helpful, the book could have benefited from a much shorter introductory essay accompanied by smaller interpretive essays and critiques matched to Marcuse’s essays.

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